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Motivation 
Our interest in investigating the economic and political aspects of international arms 
trading originated with several articles in the autumn/winter of 2010 highlighting the 
then-upcoming deal between the U.S and Saudi Arabia. The articles
1
 both note that it is 
not for purely economic reasons that the countries are involved in this deal; they also 
mention the strong political aspects that discern with whom the U.S. trades, in this case 
arming Saudi Arabia as they are an ally against the growing military might of nearby 
Iran. We chose not to focus on Saudi Arabia as the articles were too recent for it to be 
possible to analyze their impact, but the issues brought up by those articles led us to 
consider the nature of the relationship between arms trade and political ties of the U.S. 
and other countries, in particular, Israel and Pakistan. We chose those two countries for 
the distinction between their individual political and economic relationships with the 
U.S., so that we might be able to compare, contrast, and draw a conclusion from our 
analyses that could be applied to the U.S.‟s relations to other countries in general, and 
not be applicable in just one specific case.  
Problem Area 
There are several different types of arms included in the concept of arms trade. Levine, 
Smith, Reichlin, and Rey
2
 divide arms into 5 categories: weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs); major weapons systems; light weapons; dual-use equipment; and services. A 
universally agreed definition of what the arms trade consists of is difficult to come by. 
One reason is that the majority of countries involved have their own classification of 
what should be included or excluded under the category of arms, in particular the 
category of dual-use arms.
3
 One way to derive a rough definition of what is meant by 
                                                             
1 Entous, A., 2010. Saudi Arms Deal Advances [online] Available at: 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704621204575488361149625050.html> 
[Accessed 1 May 2011] and CBS News, 2010.  60B Dollar U.S.-Saudi Arms Deal Sends Message to Iran 
[online] Available at: 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/10/21/world/main6977941.shtml> [accessed 1 May 
2011] 
2
 Levine, P. Smith, R. Reichlin, L and Rey, P., 1997. The Arms Trade. Economic Policy 12(25), pp. 335-
370 
3
 Holtom, P. and Bromley, M., 2010. The International Arms Trade: Difficult to Define, Measure, and 
Control. Arms Control Today. [online] Available at: <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_07-
08/holtom-bromley> [Accessed 24 April 2011] 
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arms is to look at the export control lists, as 40 countries involved in the international 
arms trade industry have based their export control lists on the multilateral export 
control regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement of 1996.
4
 
There are areas in dispute regarding what constitutes arms trade beyond the direct 
monetary exchange for physical goods, including, but not limited to: the leasing of arms 
to other states; arms in the form of gifts or donations; and the transfer of the 
technological capacity to produce arms. Arms trade also contains a variety of alternative 
payment options, including interest-free loans, buy-back opportunities and a direct 
exchange of one good for another.
5
  For the purposes of this project we have decided to 
regard arms trade as trade within the categories defined as military expenditure as 
outlined by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI):  
“All current and capital expenditure on: 
 operations and maintenance 
 procurement 
 military research and development 
 military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country).”6 
The global arms economy post-Cold War meant that the multitude of smaller arms 
companies that had been generated during the ideologically tense period of the last few 
decades, were consolidated and merged to form larger block companies that were in 
competition with each other. The table below indicates how the number of firms has 
decreased over time. 
Table 1 U.S. Contractor Presence for Selected Military Platforms (1990-2000)
7
 
Platform Companies 1990 Companies 2000 
Fixed-wing Aircraft 8 3 
                                                             
4
 Levine, Smith, Reichlin, and Rey, op.cit. 
5
 Sandler, T and Hartley, K. 1995. Cambridge surveys of economic literature: The Economics of Defence. 
Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, p. 244 
6
 SIPRI, n.d. The SIPRI definition of military expenditure [online] Available at: 
<http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/sources_methods/definitions> [Accessed 
10 May] 
7 P.J. Dombrowski et al., 2002, as cited in Krishnan, A., 2008. War as Business: technological change 
and military service contracting. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited 
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Launch Vehicles 6 3 
Rotorcraft 4 3 
Satellites 8 6 
Strategic Missiles 3 2 
Submarines 2 2 
Surface Ships 8 3 
Tactical Missiles 13 3 
Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicles 
6 3 
Tactical Combat 
Vehicles 
3 2 
 
As they were one of the few countries able to afford continued investment in the arms 
economy post-Cold War, America accrued a large percentage of the global arms market 
as other countries were reducing their arms spending and focusing on domestic matters, 
once the threat of an ideologically fuelled war was reduced and the sheer size of the 
U.S. economy allowed their home companies to merge and stay in the market. For 
example, America accounted for 21 percent more of total global deliveries of major 
weapons in 1991, as compared to in 1987, meaning an increase from 30 to 51 percent 
overall in the span of just 4 years.
8
  
With a history of relations that have seen the two countries aligned and then at odds in 
turns, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was something we thought would be of interest to 
analyze through the aspect of arms trading. There was a positive relationship between 
the two countries in the '50s and '60s, when Pakistan was helping the U.S. by providing 
a barrier to the expansion of the Soviet influence in the Asian continent, and the U.S. 
provided weight against India‟s potential threat to Pakistan‟s security. This quickly 
changed when Pakistan sought to counter India‟s growing nuclear capabilities, with 
nuclear developments of their own, which led to the loss of their friendly U.S. relations 
and the implementation of sanctions on assistance to Pakistan. These measures were 
removed by the U.S., despite concerns over the continued expansion of Pakistan‟s 
                                                             
8
 Sandler and Hartley, op.cit., p. 251 
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nuclear development programme, in order to gain support to remove Soviet forces after 
their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
9
 Once Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, 
the U.S. once again took the growing nuclear capability ambitions of Pakistan into 
consideration and called off military cooperation and arms sales between the two 
nations. This was until the events of September 11th 2001, which caused Pakistan to 
join up in the „war against terror‟ and therefore gain America‟s support once again, seen 
by the removal of the previous restrictions on aid to Pakistan and the commencement of 
renewed arms transfers.  
Since Israel‟s foundation in 1948, the U.S. has maintained a close and friendly 
relationship with them, based on common factors such as democratic values and mutual 
security interests.
10
 As the United States is one of the key advocates of the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, it is has been a subject of great interest in the relationship between Israel 
and the U.S., though the two nations have been known to possess differing views on 
certain topics, for example, the occupation of the Golan Heights and arms trades made 
by the U.S. to Arab countries.
11
 In particular of the last few administrations in the U.S., 
Israel enjoyed a close relationship with the Bush Administration,
12
and it appears to have 
continued after the cessation of the Bush Administration, as Obama referred to Israel as 
a „strong ally of the United States‟13 shortly after assuming office. In 1985, the U.S. and 
Israel signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which called for the removal of 
impediments to trade between the two countries, including the sale of arms and defence 
related technology. The decades since have contained mostly positive relations between 
the two countries, with Israel still benefiting from extensive military and financial aid 
assistance from the U.S. 
Arms trade invokes strong reactions from human rights activists, who claim that it 
perpetuates global conflicts with no regard to the abuse of human rights,
14
 to politicians 
                                                             
9
 Grimmett, R., 2009. CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22757.pdf> [Accessed 20 April 2011] 
10
 Addis, C. 2011. Israel: Background and U.S. Relations [online] Available at: 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33476.pdf> [Accessed 13 May 2011] 
11
 Mark, C. 2004. Israeli-United States Relations. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB82008.pdf> [Accessed 17 May 2011], p. CRS-7 
12
 Addis, op. cit. 
13
Ibid, p. 22 
14
 Burrows, G. 2002. The No-nonsense Guide to the Arms Trade. New Internationalist Publications Ltd. 
Oxford, p.46 
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who laud it for creating jobs and bringing money into the domestic economy.
15
 There is 
no doubt that deals involving the exchange of arms have effects in the political sphere, 
“the international transfer of military equipment and support material is both a 
barometer of political relations between states and an active component in influencing 
those relations”16, and as they inherently also involve economics facets, either through 
the direct exchange of cash, or of goods or services in return for arms, we decided it 
would be relevant to look at the economic and political features of the arms trade 
between America and some of its partners. Arms producing countries would stand to 
gain political leverage with the provision of arms to sympathetic and allied countries,
17
 
and the purchasers of arms could stand to benefit from comparatively cheaper costs of 
buying foreign goods instead of manufacturing domestically, though at the risk of 
exposing themselves to be coerced or manipulated in some fashion through the use of 
the political leverage gained by the arms selling nations.
18
  
Many might believe the market of arms trade to be in a state similar to perfect 
competition, as there are many buyers and sellers, however, as few companies dominate 
the market, it is thus an oligopoly. This is the case because a nation‟s government has a 
direct influence on the corporations within the country; therefore a government will 
chose to focus on subsidizing a few trusted corporations instead of several relatively 
lesser known ones. For example, this is the case in the U.S. where Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon dominate the U.S. 
market of arms sales due to government subsidies. Also, international regulations are 
less harsh on large corporations that also produce goods besides weaponry for 
international trade. When taking into account the market for smaller arms or 
ammunition though, the market tends to become more competitive as there are 
significantly more goods and producers of those goods in this category than compared 
to larger military goods such as tanks and airplanes.  
Industrialized countries such as the U.S. and the United Kingdom produce and supply 
arms to developing countries due to an absolute advantage. The cost of these 
                                                             
15
 Ibid, p.77 
16
 Kemp, G. 1994. The Continuing Debate over U. S. Arms Sales: Strategic Needs and the Quest for 
Arms Limitations. The Arms Trade: Problems and Prospects in the Post-Cold War World Vol. 535, pp. 
146-157 
17
 Sandler, and Hartley, op. cit., p. 242 
18
Ibid, p. 243 
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developing countries to produce the same goods domestically, completely outdoes the 
cost of buying foreign weapons, as these countries, for example Afghanistan, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Israel etc, do not have the facilities or the manpower to produce them. They 
rely on other goods to export such as coffee beans, rice, textiles and cotton. Exports of 
an agricultural nature do not bring in the same amount of money that can be earned by 
more industrialized countries exporting technological goods or services, one of the 
reasons that many developing countries are in debt to those industrialized countries.
19
 
Problem Formulation 
Using the case studies of U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Israel, how and to what extent can 
arms trade be used to indicate a relationship between the U.S. and its allies? 
Working Questions 
 What are the effects of political relations on arms trade? 
 What are the effects of economic systems on political behaviour? 
 How do the relations in regards to arms trade compare/contrast between U.S.-
Pakistan and U.S.-Israel? 
Project design 
The project is divided into four sections.  
The first section includes the fundamentals of our project – the motivation, problem 
area, problem formulation, and our working questions. 
The second section elucidates upon our methodological choices, delimitation and our  
theory of choice: the neo-realism theory of international relations, economic theories, as 
well as framework on the concept of arms as influence. 
The third section contains data, and the subsequent analysis of said data, on the U.S.,  
Pakistan and Israel, with a focus on the U.S. and its interactions surrounding arms trade 
with the two countries. Here we answer our first and second working question. 
The fourth section contains the answer of our third working question which leads to the 
                                                             
19
 Burrows, op.cit. p. 63.  
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final discussion and overall conclusion to the problem formulation. This section also 
includes our afterthoughts on the project as a whole. 
Delimitation 
We have chosen to focus on the realm of international arms trade between U.S.-
Pakistan and U.S.-Israel within the last two decades, as we deemed it a reasonable 
amount of time from which to draw a historical background that would enable us to 
make generalizations about the nature and extent of the relationship.
20
 The last two 
decades feature two events that marked a global change in arms trade and the 
motivations behind it. Our timeline begins in the early 90s, as the end of the Cold War 
heralded a change in the nature of the arms industry and trade. This was due, in part, to 
the collapse of the Soviet state, the main supplier of the arms besides the United States. 
The fall of the Soviet Union led to a less organized arms trade to its allies, which led to 
the United States controlling a larger share of the global arms trade.
21
 It is partly due to 
that fact that we chose to centre our project on investigating the nature of the arms trade 
and relationship between the U.S. and other countries. Another important event of the 
last two decades, which led to a change in international relations and the nature of arms 
trading, was that of 9/11, which improved relations between countries that might have 
been at odds previously, as is the case with the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, on the basis 
of a common enemy.  
Israel was chosen as they are considered to be, and to have been since their creation, a 
strong ally of the United States, due to their geostrategic importance in the Middle East. 
They are in a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., as of 1985, and are also one of the 
largest beneficiaries of military aid from the United States.
22
 These factors made it 
interesting for us to try to determine if the arms trade itself could help elucidate on the 
nature and extent of the relationship.  
 
 
                                                             
20
 Kemp, op. cit., p.157 
21
 Brzoska, M. 2004. 'The Economics of Arms Imports after the End of the Cold War', Defence and 
Peace Economics, 15(2), pp. 111-123 
22
 Addis, op. cit. 
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Methods 
Hypothesis and Theory 
The hypothesis put forward by this project: 
 Arms trade can be used as an indicator of the United States’ relationship 
to Pakistan and Israel. 
Our independent variable is the United State‟s relationship to Pakistan and Israel, and  
our dependent variable is arms trade. As we believe the arms trade between the 
countries to be an indicator of their relationship, this means that political and economic 
relations change the volume of arms trade between them, and therefore, this variable 
must be independent. However, although we are focusing on this relationship between 
the variables, we can also analyse the reverse relationship, i.e. when the relations 
between the countries can be used as an indicator of their arms trade. This will be 
examined through our concept of „arms as influence‟, as it argues that a recipient 
country can modify its policy according to the influence of the supplier-state‟s arms 
transfer. 
The case studies of U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Israel will be used to test our hypothesis. To 
be able to analyse these relationships we decided to use the structural realism theory in 
the international relations realm. The reason for choosing this theory is derived from the 
fact that structural realism theory is state-centric, meaning that it assumes states are 
unitary rational actors; therefore they are seen as sovereign.
23
 Hence, non-state actors, 
such as private arms companies, are less important.
24
 Consequently, if we want to find 
out if arms trade can be used as an indicator of a state‟s relationship to its allies, we 
need to view states as the structural realists view them, as unitary, sovereign actors. We 
are aware that private companies are also involved in the arms trade business, but 
instead of focusing on them we will incorporate them as part of a sovereign state actor. 
The reason for this is that we believe private companies base their relationships mainly 
on economic factors, rather than political ones since we do not believe multinational 
companies to be politically tied to anyone. 
                                                             
23
 Hay, C., 2002. Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. Hampshire: Palgrave, p.20 
24
 Viotti, P., and Kauppi, M., 1993. International Relations Theory. New York: Maxwell Macmillian, p. 
35 
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Another reason as to why we chose structural realism theory is that it aims “to produce 
a deductive science of world politics on the basis of parsimonious assumptions about 
the international system.”25 The research that inspired our hypothesis led us to various 
examples of selfishness by the state actors. For example, the U.S. had sanctioned 
Pakistan after the 1979 invasion by the USSR, however, after the 9-11 attacks they re-
engaged relationships, arms sales included. This was done because the U.S. needed 
Pakistan‟s support in the war against terror upon which they were about to embark.26 
We observed how the international system is operated by states being motivated only by 
their national interest, just as the structural realists propose.
27
 
Apart from justifying our reasoning, we find it crucial to explain the reason for rejecting 
other international relations (IR) theories, such as neo-liberalism. Even though neo-
liberalism embraces the proposition set by structural realists that state actors are 
essential when it comes to international relations, it also claims that non-state actors are 
as important.
28
 Keeping our problem formulation in mind, we knew that if we wanted to 
find out whether arms trade could be used as an indicator of a state‟s relationship to its 
allies, we could not choose neo-liberalism. We chose not to give non-state actors the 
same importance as state actors, in order to focus on what interested us the most.  
Ontology 
Our chosen ontology is objectivism. Objectivism is the view that reality exists 
independently of our existence. It states that reality is objective and exists in an 
objective form. It views the object as existing independently, and is independent of 
human thoughts, ideas and feeling. It is a view where the world is seen as an ordered, 
structured place that is governed by physical laws.
29
 
Unlike our chosen ontology, constructionist ontology is the view that reality is socially 
constructed. It is dependent on human thoughts, ideas and feelings. It is a perception of 
the world as being constructed in the process of social interaction; we therefore 
                                                             
25
 Hay, op. cit., p. 20 
26
 Grimmett, 2009, op. cit. 
27
 Hay, op.cit., p.20 
28
 Ibid, p. 22 
29
 Bryman, A. 2008. Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 18-19 
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individually and collectively create the meaning from our experiences in a world where 
we can never know what is real.
30
 
The reason for choosing the objectivist ontology is that we share this view throughout 
our research methods and approach. We look at the different variables in an objective 
way, or at least as objective as possible. For this we adopted U.S. foreign policy as the 
perspective of reality thus making it the benchmark for the project. Our research, for the 
most part, is based on quantitative data, congress reports and numbers, this will keep us 
as objective as possible, although we are aware that biased data cannot be avoided. Our 
theory is another way to keep the analysis as objective as we possibly can, since it 
claims that systems are composed of a structure and their interacting units, however it 
leaves out leaders‟ personal motivations and characteristics as variables for 
international outcomes and only focuses on national interest.
31
 Most importantly, we did 
not choose the constructionist ontology since it claims that there is no objective reality 
that individuals can observe without constructing it in some way and so we cannot ever 
know what is „real‟. This is not applicable to our approach, since we are not basing this 
project on human experience, but rather on objective law.  
Epistemology 
The positivist epistemology assumes that reality can be observed and described 
objectively
32
. Reality is seen as being composed of separate events that can be observed 
by the human senses.
33
 These observations must be from pure experience, which means 
observing with an empty consciousness. Positivists only accept knowledge that comes 
from experience. This epistemology also denies value judgements, the status of 
knowledge given the fact that their legitimacy cannot be tested by experience. 
Positivists believe that hypotheses derived from observations are confirmed by the 
gathering of evidence, therefore the greater the evidence, the more likely the hypotheses 
to be true statements about the world. It is also argued by positivists that anything that 
cannot be confirmed by experience is meaningless.
34
 
                                                             
30
 Bryman op.cit., p. 19-20 
31
 Griffiths, M. 2007 International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: an Introduction. New 
York: Routledge 
32
 Davison, R.,  n.d. Chapter Three: Methodology. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.is.cityu.edu.hk/staff/isrobert/phd/ch3.pdf> [Accessed 20 May 2011] 
33
 Blaikie, N., 2007.  Approaches to Social Enquiry, 2
nd
. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 110 
34
 Blaikie, op. cit., pp. 110-113 
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The interpretivist epistemology alleges that the study of social phenomena requires an 
understanding of the social world, making this a subjective interpretation; it is the idea 
that what we could get to know is only the interpretation of what we might consider 
reality. For interpretivists, social reality is a product constructed by its inhabitants. 
Additionally, social worlds, or realities are always being reinterpreted by its 
individuals
35
. Interpretivists believe that social phenomena can be analysed from within 
by social scientists, though they claim it is not possible to be completely objective as 
people always interpret the world.
36
 
We have chosen to use the positivist epistemology since it takes an objective approach 
when analysing the world, unlike the interpretivist epistemology. As mentioned before, 
the aim of this project is to obtain an objective approach, and we cannot do so with the 
interpretivist epistemology. Positivists base their knowledge on experience, and the way 
we are including this, is by taking U.S., Pakistan and Israel‟s experiences to explain the 
social phenomena we are analysing. We do not believe we will alter the social 
phenomena we are studying in any way, as the interpretivists believe. We are aware that 
even facts, such as weapon sales numbers can be interpreted but we will try to remain 
objective, even though we are consciously selecting what information and facts we will 
choose to look at.  
Deductive Approach 
Deductive approaches seek to form a hypothesis or hypotheses from prior knowledge 
about a certain subject, for example, pre-established facts or initial theoretical 
assumptions
37
. This hypothesis, or hypotheses, is then broken down into smaller 
entities, in the form of variables or concepts, which can be researched. Using specific 
methods, empirical data is then collected in relation the concepts and the hypothesis is 
confirmed or rejected
38
. 
The process of deduction begins with a theory, which is used to generate a hypothesis 
and then gives rise to the gathering of data, which is used to test the hypothesis. The 
outcome of deduction is a revision of the hypothesis and hereby the theory
39
. 
                                                             
35
 Ibid, pp. 124-131 
36
Davison, op.cit. 
37
 Hay, op.cit., p. 30 
38
 Ibid, p.30 
39
 Bryman, op.cit., p. 10 
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In this case, the theory of realism is used in the field of IR. This theory was used to 
generate our hypothesis. The concepts of the hypothesis are broken down into economic 
and political aspects of the U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Israel relationships, and these 
variables are measured and researched to test the hypothesis. 
Unlike deduction, induction uses the opposite strategy, in the sense that observations 
made through research are used to generate a theory.
40
 This strategy will not be used 
because the project has a hypothesis that it wants to test, rather than an ambition to 
generate a theory from the data available. The purpose of this project is to investigate 
whether or not the recent trends in the arms trade between U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Israel 
have been compliant with the theory we are using. If we were to use induction, we 
would look at the phenomenon and try to turn it into a theory, which would not be in 
sync with the intent of our research. 
Research Methods 
Quantitative research strategy highlights “quantification in the collection and analysis 
of data.”41 It has three distinctive features: 1) it entails a deductive approach when 
looking at the relationship between theory and research; 2) its epistemological position 
is lenient towards the natural science model (positivism in particular) and; 3) it views 
social reality through the ontology of objectivism. This type of research method can be 
used for going through existing material and/or producing new information.
42
 
Quantitative data collection can occur in relation to different sets of information in 
archives, database, literature, etc. The collected data provides us with existing 
knowledge that we must interpret, for example the meaning of a number in a table. It is 
important to know the source of the data, and also to what extent it represents the 
category it was placed in. One must be critical about the found data since a theory 
cannot be based on data that has not been explained thoroughly.
43
 
Qualitative research usually accentuates words rather than numbers (quantitative data). 
It uses an inductive view of the relationship between theory and research, an 
interpretivist epistemological position and its ontological position is constructionist. 
                                                             
40
Ibid. p. 9 
41
 Ibid. p. 22 
42
Olsen, P.B., and Pedersen, K. 2008 Problem-Oriented Project Work, 2nd ed. Copenhagen: Roskilde 
University Press, p. 225 
43
 Olsen and Pedersen, op. cit., pp. 225 - 226 
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However qualitative researchers do not always follow these three features because 
quantitative data can also be used in a qualitative research
44
. The most common ways of 
qualitative data collection are semi-structured interviews on focus groups, field research 
and case studies. Qualitative research may lead to theory building, the expansion of 
concepts or to provide empirical evidence which supports theoretical definitions. It can 
also be used to test hypotheses.
45
 
Even though qualitative strategies may often reflect a constructionist or interpretivist 
positions, it does not mean that this is always the case. In other words, the associations 
between the different research strategies (quantitative and qualitative) with the different 
epistemological and ontological viewpoints are not deterministic. Therefore the 
connection between ontology and epistemology with research strategies mentioned 
previously should be seen as tendencies rather than definitive associations.
46
 
The mixed methods research strategy combines quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies
47
. According to Hammersley, as cited in Bryman, there are three approaches 
to mixed methods research: 1) triangulation: this approach entails the use of quantitative 
research to substantiate qualitative research findings or vice versa; 2) facilitation: this 
approach is brought about when one research strategy is used in order to support the 
other research strategy; and 3) complementary: this approach occurs when the two 
research strategies are employed, so that different aspects of an investigation can be 
merged.
48
 
We will be using the mixed methods research and our approach will be triangulation. 
We find it appropriate to use both quantitative and qualitative research methods, since 
our data is mostly quantitative (dates, amount of arms trade agreements, etc.), however 
we approach this in a qualitative manner by interpreting the relationships between the 
United States and Pakistan and Israel. The use of case studies is seen as a qualitative 
method of research, but these case studies have been analysed based on quantitative 
data (congress reports for example). Our approach is therefore triangulation, since we 
are using two research methods and cross-checking their findings. 
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We are using this method because we are analysing the behaviour of the United States, 
Pakistan and Israel with each other, in order to give an insight into their relations, and 
see if arms trade is therefore affected by it. We believe that even though we are using 
the mixed method research strategy, we can still stay objective to some extent.  
Data Collection 
Our main focus in this project is on sources of a quantitative nature. Our primary 
sources of empirical data will be statistics and reports compiled by government bodies 
and other independent organisations specialized in this field, for example SIPRI, the 
Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), or the non-partisan Congressional 
Research Service. We chose these as the high extent to which those organizations are 
privy to comprehensive information regarding the details of arms trade, meant that we 
were able to access as much information as publicly revealed. With the exception of 
SIPRI, the majority of our information came from American sources, which could 
account for a positive bias towards the actions of the U.S. when we consider the 
political interactions between the countries, but as we know the origin of the sources 
and are aware of the potential biases, we can take them into account and lend them 
some degree of credibility around that. 
In order to look at the political relationships between the U.S. and other countries, we 
have also chosen to analyse articles from journals, such as those from Federation of 
American Scientists (FAS), as well as books focusing on related topics, so that we can 
compile timelines of political events and significant arms deals. 
Limitations 
As the arms trade in general could be considered a sensitive topic concerning the 
national security of those involved, we have taken into consideration that there might be 
a lack of concrete information publicized by governments on the extent of their 
weaponry. The exact details of international trade agreements are often secret and might 
not be available in public domain, whilst we encounter the problem of discrepancies 
between definitions of the components involved when making comparisons of price-
related data.
49
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Theory and Concepts 
Structural Realism 
IR theories aim to explain global interactions. In today‟s modern world, everyone is 
affected by affairs going on in the whole world, and the field of international relations 
tries to make generalizations and discover trends in world politics in order to describe 
world phenomena. Of course this requires knowledge about specific cases, and the 
focus is on political, military and economic relations between nation states, and non-
state actors such as the United Nations (UN).
50
 However, in IR theory, there is a clear 
distinction between the concepts of „international relations‟ and „world politics‟, as 
international relations refers to the affairs between nation states, and world politics is a 
broader notion, which includes non-state actors.
51
 Within the field of IR there are 
paradigms, which, according to Martin Griffiths, are “a mode of thinking within a field 
of inquiry that regulates scientific activity and sets the standards for research. A 
paradigm generates consensus, coherence, and unity among scholars.”52   In natural 
science, for example, there is generally one paradigm which changes over time to fit 
new discoveries, whereas in social sciences there are several. 
The paradigm, which we have chosen to be most appropriate for this project, is 
structural realism. Realism dominated international relations in the time following the 
Second World War, and had originally a very pessimistic view of the world. Classical 
realists, also known as human nature realists, saw the world as being influenced by the 
flaws of the characteristic of humanity, and believed that human beings were 
“essentially violent, power-seeking beings.” 53  However, by the 1970‟s realism was 
revised, and with the publication of Kenneth Waltz‟s Theory of International Politics in 
1979, the view changed from classical realism to neorealism or structural realism,
54
 
which was based on “the structure of the international system within which states 
operate.”55 Waltz separated the international system into two permanent structures; the 
first being the lack of an international authority, and the second, the concept of self-
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help, meaning that all units are functionally alike.
56
 In summary, Waltz view of the 
world was that “state behaviour is driven by … the pre-emptive unpleasantness 
mandated by an anarchic international system, selfish human appetites for power, or the 
need to accumulate the wherewithal to be secure in a self-help world, explain the 
seemingly endless succession of wars and conquest.”57 
The structural realist perspective is based on a few key assumptions. The first, and most 
fundamental for the paradigm, is the notion that international relations take place in an 
arena of anarchy.
58
 This assumption refers to the absence of world government, which 
realists see as unattainable. In domestic political life, individuals, generally, accept the 
laws and constraints made by government bodies, but states have not been willing to do 
this totally yet. “The creation of a truly powerful and effective world government is still 
seen by most observers as not worth the limiting effect on the ability of states to do 
what they want, when they want.” 59  According to Thomas Hobbes, international 
anarchy leads to “war of every man against every man.”60 
Second is the assumption that states are sovereign powers.
61
 Sovereignty means 
“supreme power especially over a body politic.”62  In a democracy, the power lies 
collectively in the hands of a democratically elected government, and this authority is 
exercised in representation of the citizens. Internationally, however, there is no 
sovereign authority (i.e. anarchy) to rule all nation states; therefore the highest 
sovereign power must be individual states. Each nation state, regardless of size, military 
and economic power, has the right to make decisions about what goes on within its own 
borders. However, the decisions made by one state are bound to have an effect on other 
states, through trading, access to resources, etc. In relation to Planning, Space and 
Resources, the notion that time and space are shrinking, supports the point that no state 
can act completely independently of each other. “We have a world of almost 200 
interdependent actors, whose behaviours, values, and interests inevitably interact with 
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and conflict with one another.”63 With no international sovereign power, states must 
resolve these disputes amongst each other. 
Structural realists believe that all states are rational, unitary actors. By „unitary‟ they 
mean that “states have a set of core interests that transcend the special interests 
associated with the individual and groups they govern,”64 and by „rational‟ is meant that 
“an ends-means relationship exists between those core interests (the ends) and the 
foreign policy choices that states make (the means) to reach those ends.”65 In other 
words, a sovereign state has a list of essential interests, which exceed the needs of 
individuals in the population, and these interests are to be protected and preserved to an 
extent that is safe and creditable for the state. 
According to Waltz, the concept of self-help is a permanent structure in the 
international system. In realism, self-help is the act of defending your own interests and 
protection, and this can be carried out in two ways: 1) through military expenditure, and 
2) by creating alliances with other states. In domestic politics, rebel groups or 
oppositional political bodies may challenge the government in relation to questions of 
authority. Internationally, however, there is no superior authority, so battles are settled 
according to strength, and therefore military assets are important when maintaining 
your interests. In cases of cooperation and alliances, “the condition of insecurity – at the 
least, the uncertainty of each about the other‟s future intentions and actions – works 
strongly against their cooperation”66 and “elements of conflict in the competition of 
states outweigh those of cooperation.”67 
”In a world with no higher power to impose order and resolve disputes, with almost 200 
sovereign actors looking to defend their interests via self-help, and where efforts at self-
help and self-defence can threaten other actors in the system, states sometimes need to 
use force to resolve disputes with other states.”68 According to realists, countries are 
always in a state of potential war. This does not mean that every country is always at 
war with one another, but war is seen as a viable tool to solve disputes and protect 
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interests. Based on these concepts, it may appear as if realists are amoral, but they do 
make distinctions between moral and immoral actions, however, they separate personal 
morality and state policy. “While individuals might choose to be guided by an absolute 
ethical code, states must be guided also by the pursuit of the national interest.”69 
One of the key assumptions, and maybe the most important aspect of structural realism 
for this project, is the concept of the balance of power. According to the classical model 
of the balance of power, power in the international system will balance out more or less 
automatically.
70
 If power shifts towards one state or alliance of states, a potentially 
threatened state will increase its power or form alliances with other states to restore the 
balance. This is a dynamic process that never quite reaches equilibrium, so according to 
this model, war can never be completely eliminated, only minimized. However, due to 
domestic problems, limited resources, etc, a state might resort to "bandwagoning – 
joining sides with the rising power” to be on the victorious side in a potential conflict.71 
Some realists see the importance of having a "balancer state… [to] balance the power 
when things begin to shift.”72 An example of this was 19th century Great Britain in 
relation to Europe. With their powerful army and the world‟s largest navy, Britain could 
side with one country or alliance if their opponents became too powerful. This was, of 
course, in their own interest, so no state in continental Europe became more powerful 
than Britain. There are two prerequisites for the balance of power model to work: 1) no 
alliances are permanent (only interests are), your enemy today can be your ally 
tomorrow, and 2) war can never be completely eliminated, it might even sometimes be 
necessary to maintain the balance of power. As states are rational actors, they only 
choose to enter a war if they believe they have a reasonable chance of winning, so if the 
power of one state or alliance of states is equal to the power or another state or alliance, 
then neither side would be guaranteed victory, and there would be less incentive to 
initiate a war.
73
 
We have chosen structural realism as our main theory due to its main concepts of the 
balance of power, states as sovereign, unitary and rational actors, and the importance of 
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national interest. We feel that these concepts all help to explain and justify the 
relationship between economic and political diplomacy and the arms trade. First of all, 
the balance of power is relevant to this project for a number of reasons: maintaining 
power and defending state interests can be done by either creating alliances or by 
buying military assets, and the arms trade accounts for both of these aspects. Secondly, 
we can argue that the USA acts as a „balancer state‟ in the Middle East; and lastly, we 
can investigate whether or not „bandwagoning‟ is taking place when trading with the 
U.S.  
The concept that states are sovereign and that they are unitary, rational actors is 
important for this investigation. Since we are using a deductive approach, our theory 
forms a basis for our data collection, and since structural realism claims that states are 
sovereign, unitary actors, we must research the case studies keeping in mind that we are 
only looking at countries as a whole, rather than independent companies. Finally, the 
importance of national interests is also a crucial aspect when investigating arms trade. 
The aim of this project is to find out whether or not arms trade can be linked to the 
political and economic relationship between the U.S. and its allies, and as no country is 
likely to form alliances without the fulfilment of certain interests, these must be taken 
into account. For example, when the United States went to war in Iraq, there were many 
debates about whether or not this was justified, whether or not Iraq had weapons of 
mass destruction, cooperated with Al-Qaeda, etc. However, realists believed there to be 
a list of core national interests to be preserved such as preventing another attack like 
9/11, restricting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and upholding access to oil 
in the Persian Gulf. According to realists, the debate was about how much these 
interests were in danger, not how important they were.
74
 In the case of arms trade, we 
want to study the American interests when trading with Pakistan and Israel. According 
to the above-mentioned concepts, we wish to examine how structural realism perceives 
the arms trade. 
Arms as Influence 
In the regards of arms transfers being utilized as a mode of political coercion, Sislin 
presents a framework for which to analyse the relationship between the arms supplier 
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and the arms recipient, which we believe to be fitting with our theory of choice; 
structural realism.
75
 Sislin‟s framework came about as an interpretation of Wheelock‟s 
definition of leverage, or influence, as “manipulation of the arms transfer relationship in 
order to coerce or induce a recipient-state to conform its policy or actions to the desires 
of the supplier-state.”76  
One way in which Sislin‟s concept ties into our overall project is that one of its 
underlying principles relies on the notion that the recipients and the suppliers of arms, 
in our case Pakistan, Israel and the U.S., are rational actors.
77
 Figure 1 outlines the 
fundamental stages underlying the arms influence process.  
Figure 1 – Theoretical framework for the use of arms as leverage 
 
Essentially Figure 1 is a simplification of the process of arms trade used as influence. 
The first step is that of the recipient-state acting in a way that is not beneficial or 
pleasing to the supplier-state. On one hand, the recipient-state benefits from their action, 
despite the displeasure of the supplier-state, whilst on the other hand, the supplier-state 
is more concerned with changing the behaviour of the recipient-state as they believe 
themselves to comparatively gain more from it. The dilemma according to Sislin
78
 is 
then that the recipient wants to continue its new behaviour whilst the supplier wants to 
change the existing state of affairs. 
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The following stage is that the supplier-state then attempts to influence the behaviour of 
the recipient state in some way, under the belief that the behaviour can be substituted 
with an alternative which benefits the supplier more. This stage implies that the 
supplier-state has already taken into consideration the counter-leverage that the 
recipient-state has, and decided that the consequences of any potential retaliation is 
outweighed by the benefits the supplier stands to gain.
79
 
The method of influence can come in either positive or negative forms. Positive ways 
would include actual or promised rewards for appropriate behaviour, whilst the negative 
methods involve sanctions, threats or punishments.
80 
The reaction of the recipient-state 
is contingent upon the nature of the attempted influence, and upon an analysis of the 
two courses of action presented to the recipient-state: compliance, or noncompliance.
81 
The selection of the course of action to be taken occurs when the recipient-state has 
evaluated which presents the most overall net benefit, which is calculated through an 
analysis of the associated costs and benefits of a shift in policy, the benefits of the 
instrument of influence (the rewards or sanctions), and the probability that the medium 
of influence will be actualized, as threats or promises might not be executed.
82
 The 
determinants of successful influence are broken down into 16 points, categorized under 
5 major sub-headings, which are: the nature of the method of influence; the 
characteristics of the arms recipient; the quality of the supplier-recipient interaction; the 
characteristics of the arms supplier; and, finally, the systemic variables.
83
 
Under the first main category, there is sanction type, deterrence and policy type. The 
first element is broken down into a negative or positive type, with the strength of the 
negative reliant on the availability of other arms suppliers for the recipient-state, whilst 
the positive encouragement is more elastic and less replaceable. The second element 
differentiates between an attempt to deter or compel, stating that attempts to deter are 
more frequently successful and suggesting that is due to the lower cost for the recipient 
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to maintain its status quo instead of changing it. Policy type notes that influences on 
either the domestic or the foreign policy rates have different likelihoods of success.
84
 
The characteristics of the arms recipients contains points of consideration such as 
whether the recipients are a military or civilian regime, if they are involved in an 
international war, if there is internal dissension amongst the civilians or potential 
security threats that could lead to an increased perceived or actual need for weaponry.
85
 
Other points that could affect the success rate of influence on the recipients is whether 
they have resources of their own to withstand the potential negative modes of influence, 
and whether the state possesses its own indigenous arms-producing capabilities.
86
 
Components that make up the arms trade interaction between supplier and recipients 
are: the dependence of the recipient on the supplier‟s arms, the recipient's dependence 
on other trade with the supplier, and precedence of similar situations. High levels of 
either form of dependence increase the chances that the influence proposed by the 
supplier will be effective,
87
 whilst precedence sets the tone for the present interaction as 
past threats that were disobeyed and met with no consequences increase the incidence 
of future threats being disregarded.
88
 
In regards to the supplier, the factors that influence the effectiveness of the attempted 
mode of influence include the presidential style and supplier unity. The former is based 
on the idea that presidents exemplify different styles that translate into “presidential 
power and subsequently into policy outcomes,”89 and the latter maintains that divisions 
amongst the departments of the government of the supplier-state lend less credibility to 
the threats or punishments that are proposed.
90
 
When discussing the systemic variables, Sislin touches upon the factors in the 
international system that might have an effect on the success rate of the influence – 
hegemony and superpower relations.
91
 He posits that America‟s emergence as a global 
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hegemony and its role alongside the USSR as the superpowers of the latter 20
th
 century 
could create a set of circumstances, which affects the likelihood of successful 
influences.
92
 
Economic Aspects on Arms Trade and Their Effects on Political Behaviour 
International Trade 
“Through exchange and specialization, countries supply the global economy with things 
that they produce relatively cheaply, receiving in exchange things made relatively more 
cheaply elsewhere.”93 This is more beneficial than having many small producers in 
every country producing a number of varied goods. Most countries therefore specialize 
in different things so when these countries trade with one another they benefit from the 
cost reductions that follow. So for the sake of argument, if we assume weapons are just 
another good such as a television, the world economy will benefit from a country 
specializing in weapons production and then trading with others.  
World trade continues to grow as transport difficulties and other barriers to trade keep 
falling. The implications of time-space convergence, otherwise known as the shrinking 
of time-space, and time-space distanciation on trade are evident as the reduction in 
transport costs and well as the increased ease of communication between different 
countries/components of production have led to overall growth in global trade.  
Countries are becoming more open to trade as it is becoming more popular to have a 
variety of choices instead of the geographically limited traditional ones. Nearly half of 
world trade is trade between more economically developed countries (MEDC), while 11 
percent is trade from developing countries to the MEDCs, and 18 percent is trade from 
rich to others, which leaves 25 percent of world trade consisting of trade between the 
developing countries.
94
 Trade in raw goods, such as agricultural commodities, minerals 
and fuels, remain important because many countries import these goods then add value 
to them via processing or converting them in some way, and then re-export them. Even 
though the U.S. is mainly an exporter of manufactured goods, their primary 
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commodities account for 23 percent of total exports. This pattern is almost the same in 
their imports, as they import 22 percent on primary products and the rest 
manufactured.
95
  
International trade has been integrated into our daily lives. Because countries have 
different levels of productivity in different industries, most nations will have goods 
collected from all over the world. Tropical countries have the advantage in growing 
tropical fruits such as bananas, while temperate countries grow wheat. These nations 
then exchange their specialized goods with each other. 
Comparative advantage 
Nations benefit from producing a good that can be manufactured cheaper domestically 
and trading with another. “The law of comparative advantage says that countries 
specialize in producing and exporting the goods that they produce at a lower relative 
cost than other countries.”96  
“Trade is mutually beneficial when there are cross-country differences in the relative 
cost of making goods.” 97A reason why relative costs might be different is due to 
differences in technological capacities, where one might be more advanced 
technologically, and therefore capable of producing goods more efficiently and at a 
lower cost than other countries. Another reason is that not all labour forces in the world 
produce at an equal productive and efficient level.  
For example take Table 2 and assume that the U.S. and Pakistan are the only countries 
in the world, and all they produce are guns and butter. If they do not trade and they put 
their resources equally between guns and butter then the U.S. would produce 4 guns and 
10 units of butter and Pakistan would produce 2 guns and 13 units of butter. The U.S. 
produces guns at two times the efficiency of Pakistan but produces butter less 
efficiently; therefore the U.S. should specialize in guns and trade with Pakistan for 
butter.  
So if the U.S. uses all their resources to produce guns, the outcome would be 8 guns, 
and if Pakistan uses all their resources to produce butter they would produce 26 units. In 
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this scenario, if the countries specialize in their most efficient good and trade, then they 
would end up each with 4 guns and 13 units of butter. “The gains from trade are 
additional output of some goods with no loss of other goods.”98 Prior to trade, the 
opportunity cost of producing one gun in the U.S. was 2.5 units of butter, and the 
opportunity cost of producing one butter was 0.4 guns, where the opportunity cost of 
production of one good is defined as “the quantity of the other good that must be given 
up to create the extra production resources.”99  
Table 2 Comparative Advantage 
Countries Goods Production with 
resources shared 
between guns and 
butter 
Opportunity cost 
of producing a 
unit 
Goods acquired 
with 
Specialization 
and trade 
U.S. Guns 4 2.5 Units of butter 4 
 Butter 10 0.4 Guns 13 
Pakistan Guns 2 6.5 Units of butter 4 
 Butter 13 0.15 Guns 13 
Military Globalization 
Globalization can be defined as “the process of increasing interconnectedness between 
societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on people 
and societies far away.” 100  Some see globalization resulting in a politically, 
economically and culturally unified world.   
Within this growing of global ties is also a term „military globalization‟ as view by 
David Held. He described military globalization as the process of increasing extent and 
scope of the security relations around the world and the tighter integration of military 
forces around the world into a unified system, not to be confused with global 
militarization which means a global arms race as seen during the cold war.  
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David Held sets three categories within military globalization, 1) the globalization of 
the war system 2) the global system of arms production and transfers 3) the geo-
governance of violence. In connotation the first point refers to the geopolitical order, 
rivalry, conflict and security relations; the second point to global arms dynamics; and 
the third point to embracing the formal and informal international regulation of the 
acquisition, deployment and use of military force. 
Through globalization political, economical and cultural relations have increased in 
volume and intensity. “These intensifying relations tend to be reciprocal and can lead to 
mutual dependence. In other words, the actions of states can impact upon other states 
and the consequences of the actions can also affect their originator in sometimes-
unforeseen ways.”101 Interdependence can be both symmetric and asymmetric meaning 
that actions produce an equal impact on actors or that some actors are affected more 
than others.   
Interdependence also categorizes security relations between states. Security is still a 
main concern in this globalizing world as was shown in World War I that allies are 
extremely important even to the most dominant of forces.  
International cooperation is required in order to deal with the current global terrorist 
threats. This sort of cooperation does not only include military but also diplomatic, 
economic and technological assistance, for example Pakistan‟s involvement in the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) and American assistance to it. 
The U.S. is currently a dominating actor in military globalization. They not only 
account for half of the world‟s military expenditure but also maintain a global network 
of 700 military bases worldwide and are by far the world largest arms exporter. 
Through this dominance the U.S. uses arms exports to influence recipient nations. There 
is a mutual dependency of the supplier nation and the recipient, the supplier wants to 
influence the others action and therefore needs to sponsor them. The arms suppliers 
sometimes can be dragged into their recipient‟s conflicts due to their economic 
dependency of their sales.  
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It is argued that recipient states can move away from their dependency on their primary 
sponsor by importing weapons from multiple others and setting up domestic factories 
based on imported weapons. However the U.S. has a widening technology gap to the 
rest of the world, which not only gives them a military advantage, but also an economic 
one. Many nations therefore want to be a part of the U.S. global coalition and receive 
the latest military technology. For example “If Lockheed Martin can deliver the JSF at 
the projected price of $50 million, the plane could dominate the world‟s military aircraft 
market and destroy the European military aircraft industry.” and already eight U.S. 
allies have signed up for the JSF.  
As a part of the world gravitates towards the US due to its advances in the military 
sector, it also has to deal with many compromises in this process. One in particular 
example is that the U.S. does not plan on sharing valuable information on their JSF 
aircrafts, despite investments by partner countries, which means that if the stealth 
system goes down the recipient nation would have to wait in line for Lockheed Martin 
to have to repair it. “If the Joint Strike Fighters get a single bullet hole in the tail, we do 
not have the knowhow to mend the stealth covering. We‟d have to get to the back of the 
queue behind U.S. marines, U.S. army and U.S. navy fighters.” 102  Antonia 
Feuchtwanger British defense source.      
Oligopoly  
In economics there are two basic types of industries; perfect competition and imperfect 
competition. Perfect competition includes many firms where there are no barriers to 
entry. These firms also have no ability to affect the market price, an example of this sort 
of competition are fruit stalls and hairdressers. In comparison oligopoly, which is a part 
of imperfect competition, is a market structure with few large companies that have 
consolidated their position, with an ability to affect price.
103
 A traditional example of an 
oligopoly has been the car manufacturing industry.  The same can also be said for the 
global arms industry, if we look at each nation as a collective producing unit of its 
companies, and thus due to the different technological advances made by companies in 
different geographical region few states would emerge to act in an oligopolistic manner. 
If we look at the suppliers and their exports between 1990 and 2010, we observe that 
                                                             
102 Krishnan, A. op. cit. p.166 
103 Begg, D. op. cit. p.98 
  Project Group 19 
Page | 31  
 
the 5 countries below have dominated the arms market for two decades out of 195 
countries, reaffirming our assumption of the nature of the market. 
Figure 2 Arms Exports Percentage 
104
 
 
Oligopolistic markets are differentiated not only by the concentration of market share in 
few hands but also by the presence of natural barriers of entry, imperfect knowledge, 
non-homogeneous product and non-price competition,
105
 and these phenomenon can all 
be seen in the arms manufacturing industry.  
Due to the capital intensive nature of this industry, availability and dispensability of 
large finances behave like barriers of entry to the industry, this means that and most 
expectedly the concentration of market share would be distributed among economically 
prosperous and developed countries, as seen in the top 5 producers of arms. Also as 
knowledge and technology are such important factors to the industry, this makes it 
harder for newer countries in the industry to start production immediately rather have to 
embark on a similar process of development as the established companies had done few 
decades before, especially because of the lack of transfer of knowledge  There could 
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also be artificial barriers created, for example if there is an emerging country that wants 
to expand its domestic arms industry, other oligopolistic countries could impose 
sanctions on development aid from them, or as it was seen in 2005 with Israel and the 
U.S., when U.S. forced Israel to sign a binding agreement making U.S. consultation 
mandatory prior to arms sales to other countries. Despite the fact that U.S. and Israel 
have collaborated in many Research and Development projects, one can see U.S.‟s 
tendency to keep that knowledge within them and sell it to countries only favourable to 
them. This also shows the tendency to collude in the industry, although collusion is 
illegal, countries do cooperate and try to develop technology, thus keeping the 
knowledge within a group and getting an edge past its competitors; seen in the 
development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
106
 which is jointly developed by 8 other 
allies of the U.S. and itself but manufactured only by the U.S., while withholding some 
of its sensitive technology from its other partners
107
.      
As mentioned before the importance of knowledge and technology is highly relevant in 
a producer‟s success, but this does not mean the top 5 producing countries do not 
possess the exact level of knowledge or in a descending manner as their ranking, instead 
each country may have developed more within some sectors of defence than others, 
which is another indication of the presence of an oligopolistic market due to the 
phenomenon of imperfect knowledge thus also producing non-homogeneous products.   
Finally, the presence of non-price competition is another occurrence in this industry. 
Many a times a country would like to buy the best and the most suitable weapons 
instead of the cheapest ones, but other factors as political relationships and offset 
incentives are larger factors of influence than just price.  An example of this is the 
American FMF programme that assists recipient countries with grants and loans for 
American arms procurement or offset deals which means that instead of paying in cash 
the country could trade more instead or get licenses to manufacture a percentage of the 
ordered products in the country to generate employment and invest in itself in the 
process.  
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This reality of an oligopolistic arms market has heavy repercussions in political 
relationships. In a perfect market a buyer would have the same defence product choice 
from multiple sellers at the cheapest price, thus each seller and their products would be 
homogeneous with no additional benefits. If that was the case then if a country is 
sanctioned from buying arms from the sanctioning country, the buyer would just turn to 
another seller and obtain the exact same article for the exact same price, but this is not 
so. In the existing form of the market, a buyer must take many issues into consideration 
and one of them is of political involvement with the buyer. Generally with big deals one 
would need support and spares even after the purchase, meaning big purchases 
automatically involves the buyer and the seller in a long-term relationship, where the 
seller is superior due to its possession of the required technology. This can be seen in 
the U.S.-Israel alliance where 85% of the Israeli defence force is comprised of 
American goods, meaning any severing in their relationship would compromise Israeli 
security due to their inability to upgrade or maintain. Israel also has only Canada, 
France and Germany as minor arms exporters apart from the U.S., showing Israel‟s 
conscious dependency on America. This American dependence puts America in an 
influential position enabling them to impose their agenda on Israel to a degree. 
In Pakistan‟s case the trend of trading with America has been very different compared 
to Israel. Because of their undulating diplomatic relationship, there is a direct effect on 
Pakistan‟s procurement pattern. Unlike Israel, Pakistan had 20 other trading partners, 
mostly China and Russia, before it reengaged with U.S. in 2001. This trading pattern of 
Pakistan‟s‟ clearly indicates that it looked for political allies through arms trade, 
especially with China. Although after their reengagement, Pakistan‟s affinity for 
American defence products increased indicating their ultimate preference for an 
American relationship.  
This again highlights the effect the oligopolistic market structure of arms trade has had 
on global political relations, it has limited the diplomatic flexibility of nations thus 
supplemented the formations of long-term relations- at least some alliances with heavy 
arms trading.    
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The Economics behind Arms Trade 
The global military expenditure continues to increase since the end of the Cold War and 
has almost caught up to those levels, as it is currently USD 1 trillion. Most nations 
spend around 20-30% of their military budgets on arms procurement, where around 40-
50% is in the actual deliveries such as delivery of sales, which can sometimes stretch up 
to many years after the original contract is signed. These contracts and agreements can 
reach around USD 35 billion annually.
108
 However, as the world becomes more 
globalised, so does arms trade; and annual sales of arms has risen to nearly USD 60 
billion.
109
   
The United States has 40% of total arms sales. Their network of arms sales is worth 
USD 166 billion where they sell mostly to developing countries (usually within the 
regions of Asia and Africa).
110
 Even though the global economy has been decreasing, 
purchases continue to be great in a select few developing countries such as China, India 
and Saudi Arabia. Only ten countries account for 59% of total developing country 
recipients of arms sales, where Pakistan alone accounts for 4% and the largest, Saudi 
Arabia, accounts for 14%
111
. 
Arms trade continues to increase in this globalizing world. Several organizations have 
come together to try and control, or curb, the sales of arms. These organizations include 
Amnesty International, International Action Network on Small Arms, and Oxfam. 
These organizations state that arms trade is fuelling poverty and suffering, and is out of 
control. The lack of control allows some to profit from the misery of others. This has 
been made possible because the world is focused on controlling weapons of mass 
destruction, rather than conventional weapons which operate legally. The irony and the 
problem is that the dominating countries of world trade of arms, the USA, UK, France, 
Russia and China, are all members of the United Nations Security Council (see Table 3 
for biggest profiting companies). Because of low security or no security concerning the 
trade and usage of arms, most sellers and buyers are careless about the products and 
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often misuse them. Arms also often find their way into the wrong hands due to this 
weak control of firearms ownership, weapons management, and misuse by authorized 
users of weapons.
112
 According to structural realism, states are sovereign and act in an 
arena of anarchy. This corresponds with the failed attempts to control the arms trade, as 
structural realists do not see an effort to impose international authority as attainable. 
This project will therefore disregard international attempts to control the arms trade. 
Table 3 Top 10 Companies of Weapons Exporters
113
 
Name Origin Value of Arms Sales in 2008 
BAE Systems UK 32.42 billion USD 
Lockheed Martin USA 29.88 billion USD 
Boeing USA 29.20 billion USD 
Northrop Grumman USA 26.09 billion USD 
General Dynamics USA 22.72 billion USD 
Raytheon USA 21.03 billion USD 
EADS Pan-European 17.90 billion USD 
Finmeccanica Italy 13.02 billion USD 
L-3 Communications USA 12.16 billion USD 
Thales Group France 10.76 billion USD 
Most industrialized countries often negotiate free trade and investment agreements with 
others but exempt military spending from the demands of the agreement.  
The wealthy nations are able to not only place billions on military spending, but also 
give their corporations secretive subsidies through defence contracts. The lack of 
transparency regarding defence spending and not publicizing the exact contents of 
military deals can be linked to the issues of national security, especially in the post-9/11 
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world. Therefore in many, if not all, international trade and investment agreements, it is 
possible to find a section that excuses government programmes and policies marked 
vital for national security. In this way corporations will continue to find the loophole 
that allows them to be subsidized and gain almost unlimited military spending.
114
  
A problem with arms trade is that the industrialized nations are able to continuously 
receive these subsidies from their government, and at the same time receive tax breaks. 
The tax burden of subsidizing arms trade falls upon the average taxpaying citizen, as 
opposed to the governments that provide the subsidies. The nation even lends out 
money to other nations just so that they can buy their weapons. Examples of this can be 
seen in U.S.‟s FMF and EDA programmes subsidizing and giving out loans for 
American arms purchases.
115
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United States - Arms Trade 
The United States is one of the largest and most prolific arms suppliers in the world, 
taking first place according to SIPRI's measurements between the years 2005-2010,
116
 
providing weapons to 75 recipient countries. It has overtaken Russia as the largest 
supplier, as measured in the 2001-2005 period,
117
 and, despite the almost nation-wide 
cuts in budget spending, the industrial sector devoted to arms production is relatively 
untouched. Kemp states that it is possible to argue that arms sales and military 
assistance programmes have benefited America‟s foreign strategic interests, if taking a 
long-term view.
118
 
In America, two of the main methods used to conduct weapons trade with foreign 
countries are: foreign military sales (FMS), and direct commercial sales (DCS). The 
former consists of an agreement between the governments involved and negotiated by 
the Pentagon, whilst the latter entails the arms industry negotiating directly with the 
purchasing country after being granted a license by the State Department.
119
 
Foreign military financing (FMF) is the U.S. government programme for financing 
through grants or loans the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training, 
supports U.S. regional stability goals and enables friends and allies to improve their 
defence capabilities.
120
 
Another way the U.S. interacts in both a political and economic manner with other 
countries is through Economic Support Fund (ESF), which provides economic 
assistance to countries that are aligned with American policies, supports Middle East 
Peace negotiations and funds economic stabilization programmes. One of the major 
aims of the assistance provided via ESF is to support strategic allies of the United States 
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in their efforts to reduce government controls over markets, expand economic growth 
and increase job creation.
121
 
Trade can also occur between countries due to the U.S. government offering arms for 
free or at significantly lowered price, either as excess defence articles (EDA) under 
section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961
122
 or through emergency draw 
downs, as outlined in sections 506 or 552 of the FAA. 
Arms transfers by the U.S. can be regarded as more than just a good exchanged for 
some form of compensation, Kemp even goes so far as to say they could be “tests of 
U.S. friendships,” and with good reason. 123  The very nature of weaponry and the 
sophisticated technology related to it makes them unique in the global trade market, as 
their purpose is to maintain the security of regimes – a highly important factor in 
international relations.
124
 
The U.S.-Pakistan Case 
Pakistan-U.S. overview of relations 
The political relationship between the United States and Pakistan concerning arms trade 
has changed over the years. Throughout the 1990‟s, the United States ended military 
cooperation with Pakistan, as well as arms sales,
125
 through three major U.S. sanctions 
on Pakistan in 1990, 1998 and 1999, caused by Pakistani activity. 
In 1985, the Pressler Amendment was approved by the U.S. Congress. The Pressler 
Amendment is an added section 620 E(e) to the FAA, and it requires the President to 
officially state every fiscal year to the U.S. Congress that Pakistan does not possess 
nuclear weapons. If that is not the case Pakistan will not receive U.S economic and 
military assistance.
126
 Unfortunately for Pakistan, in October 1990, President George H. 
W. Bush failed to offer the needed guarantee and so USD 650 million in U.S. military 
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and humanitarian aid was denied to Pakistan.
127
 As a result, the delivery of the 28 F-16 
fighter aircraft that Pakistan ordered in 1989 was halted.
128
 
More sanctions were imposed in 1998 after Pakistan‟s May 1998 nuclear tests. 
President Bill Clinton invoked the 1994 Glenn Amendment and the Symington 
Amendment to impose further sanctions. The Glenn Amendment allows sanctions on 
non-nuclear power states that do nuclear testing; the Symington Amendment forbids 
military and economic assistance to any nation that distributes or accepts nuclear 
assistance.
129
 Later that year in October, the U.S. Congress passed the India-Pakistan 
Relief Act of 1998, also known as Brownback I, which gave the President the authority 
to waive, for a period of one year, the Glenn, Symington, and Pressler amendment 
sanctions against India and Pakistan. The Brownback I legislation did not include the 
sanctions regarding military assistance, dual-use exports, and military sales.
130
  
The Brownback I legislation was put into place due to the fact that Pakistan was the 
third-largest foreign purchaser of U.S. wheat, and during this time the U.S. farming was 
going through a crisis. The goal of waiving the sanctions for a year was so the relations 
would get better and Pakistan would keep purchasing U.S. wheat, ergo helping the U.S. 
farming crisis.
131
 
On October 12
th
 1999 Musharraf‟s coup took place,132 making him the tenth President 
of Pakistan.
133
 The U.S. Congress invoked Section 508 of the FAA that forbids U.S. 
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economic and military aid to any state whose government is overthrown by a military 
coup.
134
 
However, the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11
th
 2001 brought 
about another change in U.S.-Pakistani relations. During that same year the Bush 
Administration, under the authority of the Brownback II legislation, waived the Glenn, 
Symington and Pressler sanctions put on Pakistan. Additionally, U.S. started 
considering re-engaging cooperation with Pakistan in the area of defence, for example 
being able to acquire defence materials. The United States was also willing to consider 
and approve major weapon sales to Pakistan. They claimed that the reason for this 
change of policy was to secure Pakistan‟s support for the U.S. counter-terrorism 
programme.
135
 
In 2002, the United States started allowing commercial sales with Pakistan so that they 
could restore their F-16 fighter aircraft fleet.
136
 However one of the first actions of the 
United States that shows the change in policy only took place in June 2003, when 
President George W. Bush proposed a 3 billion USD assistance package for Pakistan.
137
 
This aid would commence in the fiscal year (FY) 2005 and would be given over 5 
years. 
On September 30
th
 2003 the U.S. Congress gave President Bush permission to waive 
the 1999 restrictions on Pakistan; these sanctions had to be waived annually.
138
 Later, in 
June 2004, President George W. Bush appointed Pakistan a Major Non-NATO ally 
(MNNA). MNNAs are: 1) eligible for priority delivery of defence material, 2) can 
stockpile U.S. military hardware, 3) can participate in defence research and 
development programmes, and 4) can also benefit from a U.S. loan guarantee 
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programme.
139
 Another event that took place in 2004 was the publication of the 9/11 
Commission Report. 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (also known as 
the 9/11 Commission) was released to the public in July 22
nd
, 2004. This report was 
created by U.S. congressional legislation and the signature of President George W. 
Bush. It is a full and complete description of the circumstances that brought about the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. The report also included the response to the attacks 
taken by the United States; furthermore the report proposes recommendations for 
protection towards future attacks.
140
 
The 9/11 Commission Report recognized Musharraf‟s government as being the best 
hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The report also recommended the United 
States provides a long-term support to Islamabad as long as Pakistan was committed in 
fighting extremism.
141
 This was a step forward in U.S.-Pakistan relations, which 
progressed towards a positive direction when in 2005 Washington decided to take up 
again F-16 fighter aircraft sales to Pakistan.
142
 
Another political development came about in early June 2006. The U.S.-Pakistan-
Afghanistan Tripartite Commission had its 17
th
 meeting in Rawalpindi. The meetings 
consisted of discussions on intelligence sharing and border security.
143
 But it was not 
until 2006 that the U.S. finally signed various arms trade agreements with Pakistan, 
which were worth more than USD 3.5 billion and consisted of 36 F-16 fighter aircraft 
and other related equipment. These purchases made Pakistan rank first among all arms 
clients of the United States for the year 2006.
144
 The Bush Administration explained the 
reason for this sale by stating the importance of Pakistan‟s geostrategic location in the 
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GWOT. The F-16 fighter aircraft would be able to support operations that contribute to 
the GWOT.
145
 
The Bush Administration used Pakistan‟s 2008 polls to state that Pakistan had 
democratically elected a government in Islamabad. For that reason, the U.S. Congress 
allowed President Bush to waive 1999 sanctions on Pakistan completely, without 
having to waive them annually as he was obliged to do before.
146
 
Another investment by the United States in Pakistan was made in December 2009, 
when the U.S. Department of Defence allocated approximately USD 400 million to 
train and equip the Frontier Corps.
147
 The Frontier Corps is a federal paramilitary force 
positioned in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan Province.  
The job of the force is to assist the law enforcement in maintaining law and order when 
asked to do so. However, lately the Frontier Corps has been used more and more in 
military operations against insurgents in the Balochistan province and militants in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
148
 
One of the most recent major deals with Pakistan was announced by the United States 
on October 22
nd
 2010. The arms sales agreement was worth USD 2 billion, and 
supposed to be spread out over the next 5 years, to help Pakistan fight against the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda groups.
149
 
Apart from all the key dates previously mentioned, it is important to state that the 
Pentagon reports that total FMS agreements with Pakistan for FY2002-FY2010 are 
worth approximately USD 5.4 billion. The Pentagon also claims that in-process sales of 
F-16 fighter aircraft and associated equipment account for more than half of the 
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FY2002-FY2010 FMS contracts.
150
 Furthermore, since 2001 the United States has 
supplied Pakistan with approximately USD 1.6 billion in FMF.
151
 It was announced by 
the State Department that since 2005, the FMF has been exclusively for counter-
terrorism efforts.
152
 
Table 4 U.S.-Pakistan Timeline of Relations 
U.S.-Pakistan Timeline 
Date Type/Purpose Amount 
1985  Pressler Amendment was approved by 
Congress
153
 
 
1989  Pakistan purchased 28 F-16 fighter aircrafts 
from the U.S 
 
1990  President Bush suspended 650 million USD in 
U.S military and humanitarian assistance to 
Pakistan,
154
 stopping the delivery of the 28 F-
16 fighter aircrafts that Pakistan purchased in 
1989 
 U.S. ended military cooperation and arm sales 
to Pakistan. 
 
 
1998  Pakistan does nuclear testing which leads to 
President Bill Clinton setting more sanctions 
on them
155
 
 Sanctions later eased by the U.S. under the 
requirements of the India-Pakistan Relief Act 
also known as Brownback Amendment I
156
 
 
1999  Congress called upon Section 508 of the FAA  
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which prohibits all U.S. economic and military 
aid toward Pakistan
157
 
2001, Post-
9/11 
 The Bush administration waived the past 
sanctions under the authority of the Brownback 
II legislation,
158
 decided to re-engage with 
Pakistan in the field of defence cooperation, 
and was willing to consider and approve 
weapon sales 
 
2002  United States allowed commercial sales for 
Pakistan to refurbish part of its older fleet of 
American made F-16 fighter aircraft 
 Security Related Aid 
 
 
 
USD 1.25 billion 
2003  President George W. Bush stated that the 
United States would provide Pakistan with a 3 
billion USD assistance package
159
 
 Coup related sanctions removed, but are 
renewed annually 
 Security Related Aid 
 
 
 
 
 
USD 1.25 billion 
2004  President Bush designated Pakistan a MNNA 
 The 9/11 Commission Report (July 2004) 
identified the government of President 
Musharraf as the best hope for stability in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
160
 
 Security Related Aid 
 
 
 
 
 
USD 1.25 billion 
2005  35 T-37 aircraft under EDA 
 Security Related Aid 
USD 24.6 million 
USD 1.25 billion 
2006  Pakistan and U.S. signed a major arms transfer 
funded entirely by Pakistani national, 
purchasing: 
USD 3.5 billion 
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- 36 F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighter aircraft 
- Missiles and Bombs for the F-16C fleet 
- Upgrade kits for Pakistan‟s F-16A 
- 155mm Self-propelled howitzers 
This purchase almost equalled the sum of all 
FMS purchases made by Pakistan from 1950-
2001 
 17th meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan 
Tripartite Commission in Rawalpindi.
 161
 
 Pakistan ranks as the biggest client for U.S. 
manufactured arms during this year 
 Security Related Aid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USD 1.3 billion 
2007  20 refurbished Cobra helicopters under EDA 
with USD 75 million from the U.S. to 
modernise these helicopters 
 5,250 TOW anti-armour missiles 
 AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars 
 Security Related Aid 
USD 38.2 million 
 
 
USD 186 million 
USD 100 million 
USD 1.13 billion 
2008  4 refurbished F-16B aircraft given to the 
Pakistan Air Force by the U.S. under the EDA 
programme. 
 20 T-37 aircraft under EDA, with no purchase 
charge but only shipping costs 
 1999 sanctions were waived completely, 
nullifying the annual renewal requirement  
 Security Related Aid 
USD 50 million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USD 1.53 billion 
2009  Security Related Aid 
 U.S. Department of Defence has distributed 
approximately 400 million USD to train and 
equip the Frontier Corps
162
 
USD 1.7 billion 
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2010  Special Representative to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan‟s (SRAP) office released its 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional 
Stabilization Strategy calling for improved and 
increased coordination among the 60 countries 
and international organizations providing 
assistance to Pakistan 
 Transfer of USS McInerney (FFG-8) frigate 
ship to Pakistan under EDA with USD 78 
million worth upgrading and refurbishment by 
the U.S. 
 U.S. transferred 8 P-3C surveillance aircraft 
(Maritime & Anti-Submarine) to Pakistan 
under the EDA 
 Security-Related Aid 
 U.S announces an arms sales deal with 
Pakistan to help boost the fight against Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USD 86.4 million 
 
 
USD 2.74 billion 
USD 2 billion 
(over 5 years) 
  
What are the effects of political relations on the arms trade between the U.S. and 
Pakistan? 
By looking at the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from the 1990‟s to the present day, it is 
clear that the United States has the upper hand when it comes to arms trade. They are 
the ones able to impose sanctions on aid and arms transactions to Pakistan, such as the 
1990 and 1998 sanctions. However, there have been times where Pakistan has always 
put its national interests and security first, and this has lead to Pakistan being a victim of 
U.S. sanctions. To further explain this scenario, we are applying Sislin‟s concept of 
„arms trade as an influence‟ to three events (1990, 1998 and 2001) of the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship. These three events were chosen because they accentuate the situation 
mentioned above. 
 
1990 sanctions 
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Figure 1 illustrates the different stages of Sislin‟s concept; the first stage occurs when 
the supplier-state (United States) does not approve of the behaviour of the recipient-
state (Pakistan). The United States did not approve of Pakistan‟s growing nuclear power 
since it could create a nuclear arms race in the region.
163
 For that reason the Pressler 
Amendment was passed in 1985, and this falls into what Sislin calls a negative method 
of influence. This is the second stage, where the U.S. is using the Pressler Amendment 
as a threat in hopes of changing Pakistan‟s actions towards their nuclear capabilities. 
Unfortunately for the United States, Pakistan did not change its mind and was therefore 
sanctioned in 1990; this sanction also falls into the negative method of influence 
category. 
The final stage emphasizes the recipient‟s reaction. In this case, Pakistan did not change 
its policy regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan decided to put its national interest first 
and face U.S. sanctions. Pakistan believed that its nuclear capabilities are a way of 
establishing itself as a regional power, and furthermore, they wanted to assume political 
leadership in the Muslim world and claimed that to achieve it they needed to be the first 
Islamic nuclear power. Additionally, Pakistan feared a possible Indian military attack 
and therefore wished to be prepared.
164
 
1998 sanctions 
In May 1998 India conducted nuclear testing and so did Pakistan shortly after. The 
United States of America condemned those tests since it went against the U.S. nuclear 
non-proliferation policies in South Asia.
165
 This led to additional sanctions (negative 
method of influence) set by the Clinton administration, which cut off U.S. economic, 
but most importantly, military aid to Pakistan. Unfortunately for the United States, 
Pakistan remained set on advancing their nuclear weaponry. Apart from the reasons 
mentioned previously, Pakistan might also have disregarded the United States‟ 
sanctions due to International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and economic aid from other 
international organizations.
166
 These loans were given to Pakistan since its economy 
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was viewed as being dependent on international aid, therefore the sanctions would have 
weakened their government.
167
 
Post-September 11 terrorist attacks 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks took place, Pakistan did not show its immediate 
support toward the United States. This behaviour was seen as a non-beneficiary and 
thus the United States officially called upon Pakistan‟s assistance. The United States 
was aware of Pakistan‟s geostrategic location, which made them a necessary ally.168 
The U.S. started waiving the 1990 and 1998 sanctions immediately (positive method of 
influence). Pakistan responded with a positive and engaging attitude, ready to fight 
terror alongside the United States. 
The reason behind Pakistan‟s involvement in the war was fear of U.S. hostility rather 
than support to their cause. For example if they were to deny the United States their 
support, then the U.S. might have created a stronger bond with India, thus making 
Pakistan vulnerable. Furthermore, Pakistan did not want to become a target in the 
GWOT.
169
 
The 1990 and 1998 sanctions were unsuccessful attempts at using arms trade as an 
influence in policy. In the other hand, post-September 11 attempts were successful. 
Either way it can be concluded that the United States, to a certain extent, has power 
over Pakistan when it comes to trading arms. This is because Pakistan has always put its 
national interests first, despite the threats and sanction given by the United States. 
In relation to our original question we can conclude that the arms trade depends on the 
relationship; if the political relations are on a positive note the arms trade increases, if 
the relationship is negative then the arms trade decreases. 
When the political relation between the U.S. and Pakistan is positive, the arms trade 
between the nations increases. For example since Pakistan joined the fight against 
terror, all sanctions have been waived (1990, 1998 and 1999 sanctions were waived); a 
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3 billion USD assistance package was delivered (2004); major arms trade agreements 
worth more than 3.5 billion USD were signed (2006); 400 million USD distributed to 
train and equip the Frontier Corps (2009) and most recently a 2 billion USD arms sales 
deal (2010). In other words, since the U.S.-Pakistan relationship turned positive the 
arms trade between them has increased. 
As a contrast we can take a look at the relationship when it was in negative terms. 
When the United States did not approve of Pakistan‟s nuclear programme and military 
coup, they sanctioned Pakistan. Due to all these restrictions, the arms transfer went 
down during this period. 
Figure 3 Comparison of Political Relations and Pakistan Aid 
 
Table 5 Normative Assessment of U.S.-Pakistan Relations 
Year Nature Political Environment Va
lue 
U.S. Aid & Arms 
Transfer 
Va
lue 
1990 Negative 
President George H.W Bush could not prove 
the absence of nuclear weapon in Pakistan, 
enacting Pressler Amendment (1985) 
-1 Cancellation of F-16 Deal 
Sanction on future arms 
trade or aid support 
-2 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1990 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Comparison of Political Relations and 
Pakistan Aid 
Political Relations US aid or Arms transfer to Pakistan Pakistan aid
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1998 Positive Eased American sanctions on Pakistan  +1 None 0 
1999 Negative Fully imposition of American sanctions on 
Pakistan, Military coup in Pakistan 
-2 None 0 
2001 Positive 9/11 attacks, boosting Pakistani Strategic 
importance. Also, American sanctions were 
eased 
+2 None 0 
2002 Positive 
Resumption of commercial sales (First time in 
12 years- Major Milestone)  
+2 
 
Resumptions of 
commercial sales 
Resumption of U.S. Aid 
support 
+2 
2003 Positive 
All coup related legislations against Pakistan 
are removed (Recognition of Musharraf 
Government – Major Milestone) 
+2 Aid Transfer +1 
2004 Positive 
Pakistan declared Major Non-NATO ally 
The 9/11 Commission Report (July 2004) 
identified the government of President 
Musharraf as the best hope for stability in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan 
+2 Aid Transfer +1 
2005 Neutral 
 
0  T-37 Trainer aircraft 
deal 
 Aid Transfer 
+2 
2006 Positive 
U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite 
Commission in Rawalpindi on intelligence 
sharing and border security 
+1  Biggest arms deal for 
year the U.S. in 2006 
ordered by Pakistan, 
covering fighter jets, 
missiles & bombs, 
upgrade kits and 
artillery cannons  (+4) 
 Aid Transfer 
+5 
2007 Neutral 
 
0  20 refurbished Cobra  
 5,250 TOW anti-
+4 
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armour missiles 
 AN/TPS-77 
surveillance radars 
 Security Related Aid 
2008 Positive 1999sanctions were waived 
completely, nullifying the 
annual renewal requirement 
(Confirmation of trust in 
Pakistani Government – Major 
Milestone) 
+2 Arms transfer (F-16 & T-
37 Aircraft) 
Aid Transfer 
+3 
 
2009 Positive 
Pakistani security forces launched major and 
apparently successful offensive operations in 
the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province against pro-
Taliban militants, encouraging U.S. and other 
Western observers that Islamabad is willing to 
undertake sustained counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism efforts, 
+1 
U.S. Department of 
Defence has distributed 
approximately 400 million 
USD to train and equip the 
Frontier Corps 
 Aid Transfer 
+2 
2010 Positive SRAP‟s office released its Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy 
calling for  improved and increased 
coordination among the 60 countries and 
international organizations providing assistance 
to Pakistan 
+1  Frigate Ship 
 P-3C surveillance 
aircraft 
 Security-Related Aid 
 USD 2 billion Arms 
Deal 
+4 
 
The onset of investigations starts from 1990, and immediately we categorised this year 
as a negative year in U.S.-Pakistan relations as America had cut off all military and aid 
relations, and even cancelled an F-16 order by Pakistan, due to Pakistan‟s increase in 
nuclear activities to try to match India‟s growing nuclear power. We issued a ranking of 
-1 for the political action, and -2 for the military field because the F-16 deal was 
cancelled and future possibilities of military and aid transfers were also dropped. The 
fact that there was no immediate resumption in positive political action highlights the 
fact that Pakistani action dented American trust heavily, it also as gives us insight into 
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Pakistani importance in American goals, as there was no attempted revival of the 
relationship.  The disproportionate effect on arms trade is also a proof of high negative 
impact of conflicting political decisions.  
The year 1998 saw some revival in positive experiences between the 2 countries when 
some of the 1990 sanctions were eased, leading to a +1 value. This was mainly due to 
the fact that the U.S. farming industry was going through a crisis and they needed to 
improve the relations with the third-largest foreign purchaser of American wheat, 
Pakistan. Despite the easing of some sanctions, no transfers were seen, thus we have 
allotted a value of 0. Even though a positive move was initiated by the U.S., no arms or 
aid transfers were carried out in this year indicating the low level of confidence in 
Pakistan.  
1999 was not a profitable year for the U.S.-Pakistan relations, despite the positive 
signals sent by the U.S. in 1998, due to the nuclear development continuing in 
Pakistan.
170
 The year also saw a military coup in Pakistan, causing high friction with 
U.S. foreign policy and forcing the U.S. back into the position of having to use 
sanctions, earning a -2 value. Like the previous years, this year no arms transfer was 
carried through giving a value of 0 for the military-curve. The graph represents a direct 
influence on political events in Pakistan on its relations with the U.S., although we 
cannot study the effects on arms transfer as there were none.     
2001, post the terrorist attack of 9/11, served to positively influence Pakistani-U.S. 
relations. The 9/11 attacks launched the American man-hunt for Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan, making Pakistan a required ally for its strategic importance to this 
operation. In this light, all previous sanctions on Pakistan were eased, except for the 
1999 sanctions, earning this year a +2. This year marked the diplomatic revival of the 
two countries, but there was no resumption in arms transfer. Again these events cannot 
be contrasted to arms transfer, due to its absence. 
With the positive backdrop of 2001, the successive year of 2002 was a major turning 
point in the area of arms transfer because, for the first time after 1990, commercial sales 
were resumed allowing Pakistan to refurbish their aging F-16 fleet. The monumental 
                                                             
170
 BBC News, 2011. Pakistan:Timeline. [online] Available at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1156716.stm> [Accessed on 22
nd
 May 2011] 
  Project Group 19 
Page | 53  
 
nature of the resumption of commercial sales earns the year a value of +2 and the sales 
of parts for F-16 and a security-related aid transfer of USD 1.25 billion gives it a +2 
value as well, showing a proportionate effect of political action on arms trade for this 
year.  
In 2003, all coup-related sanctions were lifted for the first time making it a major 
milestone as it meant the full American recognition of Musharraf‟s government, 
although this waiver had to be renewed by the American President annually; therefore 
we allotted a value of +2 for political action. Thus we allotted a value of +2 for political 
action. The security related aid remained constant showing American commitment in 
the renewed alliance. This year has an affirmative correlation between positive political 
environment and arms trade with tangible trust shown in the Pakistani government, the 
same trust was extended in the continuation in the aid given. 2004 saw Pakistan titled a 
MNNA for the U.S., and also the 9/11 Commission Report furthered the trust shown in 
President Musharraf. The aid remained constant and was not decreased.  
We did not observe 2005 to be as politically active as the other years, thus we declared 
it a „neutral‟ year in regards to arms transfers. 35 T-37 training aircrafts were 
transferred to Pakistan at reduced prices as EDA. This could be seen as an attempt by 
the U.S. to facilitate Pakistani air force improvement and expansion to ultimately 
smooth the progress of the NATO operation in Afghanistan and the border, thus 
showing a slight long term commitment, though this commitment could either be to the 
war or to Pakistan. It could also be argued that America gave away these aircrafts just to 
make space for its new upgraded T-6A Texan II
171
 training aircrafts. Although observed 
as a neutral year by us, the previous year‟s positive relations most probably have 
continued in this year.  
2006 was a significant year in the U.S.-Pakistan relations as Pakistan utilised their 
newly gained ability to order from the U.S. again by signing a USD 3.5 billion deal 
financed entirely by their national funds. This deal also made them the biggest client for 
the U.S. in 2006 and was accompanied by slight increase in the aid transfer to USD 1.3 
billion. The magnitude of this deal and its components made us allot +5 to the military 
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curve for this year. In the political arena, U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan held a tripartite 
meeting discussing border security and intelligence sharing.
172
 This event was 
particularly important because it reaffirmed Pakistan‟s commitment to the GWOT, 
especially discussing sensitive topics with a reserved neighbour that constantly claimed 
that Osama Bin Laden was sheltered in Pakistan.
173
 There is a relational effect of 
political environment on arms procurement, but the major deal seen in this year can be 
credited mostly due to the build-up of trust between U.S. and Pakistan coupled with 
Pakistan‟s increasing importance in border security where the F-16s would be useful.   
2007 saw a flurry of relatively modern technology flowing into Pakistan with the fact in 
mind that the last, they received refurbished and modernised Cobra Helicopters, anti-
tank TOW missiles and a portable long-range radar system. Apart from the previous 
order in 2006, this was one of the first sets of modern weapons making its way into 
Pakistan, even after 6 years of reengagement, signalling a build-up in U.S. trust in 
Pakistan. It is rather interesting to analyse the use of this military equipment: the anti-
tank missile, apart from its use in Afghanistan due to its portability and adaptability, can 
also be used to protect other fronts such as the India-Pakistan borders
174
; also, the 
portable long range radar that Pakistan acquired to “curb the drug traffickers' 
unrestricted movement into the borders from its neighbouring countries” according to a 
Pakistani Air Force (PAF) statement
175
 can also be used in other fronts, due to its 
missile and aircraft tracking option.
176
 This strengthening of the Pakistani defence force 
by the U.S., and not only in respect to Afghanistan, could be an indicator of U.S.‟s 
growing commitment in securing Pakistan‟s overall security, and not just 
supplementing its operation in the war on terror.  
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In another landmark decision, in 2008, America annulled the annual renewal of 
previous waivers, increasing confidence in their alliance with Pakistan and the Pakistani 
state. This year saw yet another arms transfer of F-16 and T-37s to the PAF, continuing 
the trend of arms transfers from 2006. In 2009 Pakistan reaffirmed their commitment to 
the war after launching a major offensive against pro-Taliban militants in Pakistan, thus 
earning acclaim from international partners. This evolving role of Pakistan was 
supplemented by the U.S. training and equipping the Pakistani Frontier Corps.  
In 2010 a SRAP report highlighted the need for better support for Pakistan, which could 
be seen as the reason behind a USD 2 billion arms deal between Pakistan and U.S. 
Pakistan also received a frigate ship and a marine surveillance system during this year, 
which would be more useful in securing marine space along India, than in the 
Afghanistan war. Thus, this may once again indicate the U.S.‟s interest in securing 
Pakistan‟s complete national security. As for the correlations, the positive constant 
relation between politics and arms transfer continues even through this year.  
Pakistan’s Economy 
Pakistan is a less developed country (LDC), even though it has assembled a positive 
movement forward since 2000. This is mainly because of the government‟s pro-growth 
policies and in large part due to foreign aid since the terrorist attack of 9/11. This 
growth has been measured at an average of 6.6% from 2002 to 2007.
177
 A political 
crisis in 2007 harmed their economy as the country‟s main stock market lost value and 
the country‟s attractiveness to foreign investment decreased as the country was seen as 
unstable. Food prices in Pakistan have increased, which has contributed to further 
inflation and, in turn, exhausted exports. In order to counter the rise in food prices, the 
new government has placed food subsidies and has ordered cuts in federal spending, 
including military, also due to the rising fuel costs. Regardless of these negative factors, 
the future economic position of Pakistan is improving, and has done so since 2001. 
Pakistan however is a country that depends on foreign loans, aid and importation of 
basic goods. Their internal and external debt almost reaches three-fifths of their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  
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Pakistan‟s GDP had grown by 5.8% in the fiscal year178 that ended in June 2008. This 
growth was influenced by a booming service sector and manufacturing sector, however 
the agricultural sector continues to lag. Agriculture takes up a large amount of 
Pakistan‟s labor, measured at nearly half of the working population, but only accounts 
for one fifth of national income and 2% of tax revenue.
179
 There is a foreseeable growth 
due to textile production expansion and the government‟s policies on pro-growth 
measurements, though they have been slowed as a result of political and security 
turmoil in 2008.  
Pakistan has been in external debt for a long time. They were able to stabilize this debt 
at USD 33 billion in 2003, but that did not last long as it quickly rose to USD 46 billion 
by 2008. Pakistan‟s debt is currently at a fourth of their GDP, which is still an 
accomplishment taking into account that debt was at one half in 2000. Most analysts 
believe that Pakistan‟s inflation is the current biggest obstacle for their economic 
growth.
180
 This inflation exists on account of high commodity and oil prices. They place 
their faith in Pakistan‟s resources and entrepreneurial skills, which might hold the 
promise for more growth and development. The same holds true for the Pakistani textile 
industry that amounts to two thirds of all exports, of which 90% goes to the United 
States. 
It is believed that Pakistan should further expand their tax base so that it can provide 
increased revenue to invest in health, education, infrastructure, etc. Pakistan has also 
been affected by environmental degradation; the World Bank estimated in 2007 that at 
least 6% of Pakistan‟s GDP was lost to illness and premature deaths caused by air 
pollution, inadequate water supplies, sanitation and hygiene. This environmental 
damage also has effected and reduced agricultural productivity as the soil has degraded.    
After September 2001, Pakistan‟s macroeconomic outlook greatly improved as they 
joined the fight against terrorism and were provided with large amounts of external aid, 
especially from the United States.  
                                                             
178 According to the Pakistani fiscal year 
179
 Kronstadt, 2009, op. cit. p.81 
180
 Ibid., p.82 
  Project Group 19 
Page | 57  
 
The U.S.-Pakistani economic relations 
Pakistan‟s main exports are textiles, chemicals, sports goods, leather products, rice, and 
carpets and rugs, an assortment fairly typical for an LDC.
181
 Even though China is the 
country‟s leading trade partner, due to close contact compared to America, the United 
States is undoubtedly Pakistan‟s leading export market. In 2008 total U.S. imports from 
Pakistan were worth USD 3.6 billion, while Pakistan‟s imports from the U.S. were 
worth USD 2.1 billion. Pakistan has been trying to improve their trading relations by 
decreasing their barriers to trade and tariffs, however some still remain. They are eager 
to finish a treaty that will allow free trade between them and the U.S., they believe that 
they will profit in the textile sector with duty free access to the U.S. market.
182
   
Much of Pakistan‟s foreign investment originates from U.S. investors. Investment 
exceeded USD 6 billion in 2008, but many investors are still uncertain on Pakistan, as 
their political security is viewed as somewhat unstable.  
The U.S. has been supplying aid to Pakistan for a long time, at a total amount of USD 
16.5 billion between 1947 and 2007. This includes USD 4.5 billion in military 
programmes. Since the reengagement of the U.S. in Pakistan post 9/11, Pakistan, by the 
end of the 2008 fiscal year, had received USD 12 billion. The majority of this amount 
went to coalition reimbursements, including USD 3.1 billion for economic reasons, and 
USD 2.2 billion for security related plans. With its assistance to Pakistan the U.S. seeks 
to maintain Pakistan‟s support on the war on terror, and “…encourage Pakistan‟s 
participation in international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and support in the development of a moderate, democratic, and civilian 
government which promotes respect for human rights and participation of its citizens in 
government and society.”183 
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Figure 4 U.S. Aid to Pakistan (rounded to the nearest millions of USD)
184
 
 
The partnership with Pakistan grew in July 2008 when the U.S. presented the Enhanced 
Partnership with Pakistan Act. It sought to “affirm and build a sustained, long-term, 
multifaceted relationship with Pakistan,” 185  and will continue arms and military 
assistance, as long as Pakistan makes a determined effort to prevent terrorist groups 
from operating on Pakistani soil.  
U.S.-Pakistan Analysis by means of structural realism 
The main aspect of structural realism which is clear in the case of arms trade between 
the United States and Pakistan is the maintenance of American interests in Pakistan and 
the surrounding region. As shown in the timeline, arms trade agreements between the 
two states have only been made when America have had clear incentives to make deals 
with Pakistan. During the Cold War, the incentive to minimize Soviet control in 
Afghanistan induced a positive relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, but when 
this was no longer necessary, during the decline of the Soviet Union, military sales were 
suspended in 1990 on the grounds of the disapproval of Pakistan‟s nuclear programme. 
In 2001, however, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted a renewal of their relationship, 
when Pakistan committed to assisting in the war on terror, and as America again had a 
use for Pakistan in the region, arms agreements were renegotiated. American interests, 
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in this case the wish to prevent future terrorist attacks, were upheld by the alliance with 
Pakistan due to its relevant geostrategic location in relation to the war against terror. 
This is important to our theory of structural realism because it shows that national 
interests transcend other factors in the relationship between countries. A former senior 
State Department official in the United States claims, according to Stohl and Grillot, 
that “convincing Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to switch his allegiance from the 
Taliban to the United States during the week after 11 September 2001 was the single 
most important post-11 September event for the United States, and essential to U.S. 
prosecution of the war in Afghanistan.”186 The war in Afghanistan would not have been 
possible without the help of Pakistan, and therefore Pakistan “deserves to be rewarded 
with arms sales.”187 This event is compliant with our theory of structural realism, as it 
perfectly demonstrates the importance of the maintenance of national interests. 
Although American-Pakistani relations were not optimal prior to the terrorist attack on 
9/11, the agreement of Pakistani cooperation in the „war on terror‟ would secure 
American interests, and therefore an alliance was formed. 
In relation to the balance of power, this case is also compliant with the structural 
realism theory. We can argue that Pakistan has engaged in „bandwagoning‟ with the 
United States, when joining sides with them in the war against terror, as stated 
previously, their main reason for assisting America, was fear of a strengthened 
relationship between the U.S. and India. Furthermore, the U.S. can be said to act as a 
„balancer state‟. In order to maintain the balance of power in the region, the creation of 
an alliance with Pakistan limited the power of Afghanistan. According to structural 
realism, gaining power can be done through forming political alliances or gaining 
military assets, so if we consider arms to be a form of power, we can argue that by 
giving Pakistan weapons the U.S. restored the balance of power against Afghanistan in 
the region. This proves the “classical model of the balance of power”, as power is 
restored automatically. The United States was fighting a war against Afghanistan and 
wished to, first of all, get access to Afghan borders through a neighbouring country, and 
secondly, secure an ally in the region who could control local conflicts, and by doing 
this the power of Pakistan was increased in relation to Afghanistan. 
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Pakistan has used American arms procurements to secure self-help, the action of 
defending national interests and security. In other words, Pakistan has secured military 
assets to defend themselves from their enemies, and in particular, India. Furthermore, 
the motive to join sides with the United States in the war on terror was the fear of 
India‟s relationship with the U.S. 
Concluding the U.S.-Pakistan case 
Looking back at our first working question, „what are the effects of political relations 
on arms trade?’ we can definitely conclude, based on this case, that the relationship 
between the supplier and the recipient does have a clear effect on their arms trade. In 
this case, the U.S. has the upper hand in relation to arms trade agreements with 
Pakistan, as they are able to impose sanctions on aid and trade, and it is the relationship 
between the two countries that determines how much aid and arms the U.S. wishes to 
provide to Pakistan. However, Pakistan has shown that they are not always affected by 
the sanctions America has imposed, and in most cases the U.S. has been unable to 
influence Pakistani policies with their sanctions. In obedience with the structural realist 
theory, Pakistan seems to have always put their national interest first, even over threats 
and sanctions. In relation to the concept of „arms as influence‟, we can conclude that the 
concept does apply to this case, however, using arms as an influence in another country 
is not always effective, as shown by the absence of a Pakistani reaction to the sanctions 
imposed in 1990 and 1998. 
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The U.S.-Israel Case 
U.S.-Israel overview of relations 
The relationship between the United States and Israel is one mainly based on political 
and financial support from the former to the latter. The interactions between them 
consist for the most part of the U.S. outlining a course of action for Israel to take in 
order to promote peace over the discord between Israel-Palestine, and reacting 
accordingly to Israel‟s actions in the area, or more recently, of disapproval concerning 
Israel‟s use of American weapons, including re-sales to countries that are not in the 
interests of the U.S. foreign policy. 
Prior to the Persian Gulf War of 1991, relations between the U.S. and Israel were tense, 
following falling-outs in 1989 and 1990; first, over a statement by the then-Secretary of 
State suggesting that Israel “forswear annexation”, “stop settlement activities” and “lay 
aside, once and for all, the dream of a Greater Israel,”188 and then by President George 
H.W. Bush‟s disregard of Israel‟s claimed sovereignty over East Jerusalem, where he 
reiterated the U.S. belief that East Jerusalem was occupied territory.
189
 However, 
despite these issues, the U.S. came to support Israel in the face of Iraqi missile threats, 
and urged Israel to refrain from engaging in conflict and enable enforced retaliation.
190
 
The end of the Persian Gulf War led to a renewal of American interests in the 
establishment of peaceful relations in the Middle East.  
President Bush‟s speech in 1991 is often cited as summarizing the principal policy 
objectives of the new order in the Middle East after the Persian Gulf War. It mentions 
the need for the creation of shared security arrangements in the Middle East, and states 
that, though the greater part of the responsibility would be shouldered by the countries 
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located in the region, the U.S. pledges to stand with them and work towards the 
interests of peace.
191
   
U.S.-Israel relations improved after the victory of the Labour party in the 1992 election 
in Israel. Going against the behaviour of the former government, the Labour coalition 
conceded a partial housing freeze in occupied territories just a month after coming into 
power. This complied with the terms of procuring loan guarantees set down by 
President Bush, so, during the Prime Minister of Israel‟s visit to the United States in 
August 1992, President Bush granted loan guarantees of USD 10 billion over 5 years to 
Israel.
192
 
In 1993, President Bill Clinton bore witness to a handshake between Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at the signing of a 
Declaration of Principles on interim Palestinian self-government. Additionally, in 1994, 
as part of the greater U.S. goal of achieving peace in the Middle East, he also oversaw 
the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
193
 Whilst not directly relevant 
to the relationship between the U.S. and Israel, the fact that the President was there as a 
representative of the United States, indicates the depth of their relationship or the 
significance placed upon the United States by Israel.  
In 2002, President Bush proposed a 3 year guideline to lead to the resolution of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict through the creation of a Two-State solution to the dispute.
194
 
In early 2005 the USA imposed sanctions on Israel‟s arms industry and withheld 
technical assistance and information sharing in relation to a number of projects, 
including the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) combat aircraft as a culmination of the tensions 
between the two countries over Israel‟s sales of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and 
related spare parts to China in 2000 and 2002.
195
 This led to an agreement between 
U.S.-Israel limiting the freedom of future Israeli arms deals to those that take American 
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foreign policy interests into consideration, and subjecting prospective deals to 
„American consideration‟ before they could be actualized. After the conclusion of that 
agreement, the sanctions were removed and cooperation occurred once more. 
In 2006, President Bush stated that the U.S. would defend Israel militarily, despite not 
sharing a mutual defence agreement,
196
 and 2007 saw the finalization of a deal between 
the U.S. and Israel, agreeing to a 25% increase in the then-current military aid package - 
equivalent to USD 30 billion over the next 10 years.
197
 In the words of the Israeli Prime 
Minister, Mr. Ehud Olmert, the new arrangement proved “the depth of the relationship 
between the two countries and the United States‟ commitment to Israel‟s security.”198 
This deal came on the heels of others with nations in areas of particular interest to the 
U.S., such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as part of a concerted effort to help their allies in 
the Middle East, to act as a check for the developing might of Iran. Of the aid they are 
being appropriated, Israel is permitted to devote just over a quarter of it to spending 
within itself, whilst the remainder must be spent on buying U.S. arms, a condition 
within the agreement that is unique to this instance of U.S. military assistance.
199
 
In March 2010, a fall-out occurred between the Obama Administration and Israel over 
the Israeli announcement of the planned construction of more homes in the occupied 
East Jerusalem.
200
 Despite the disapproval of the U.S. of such a move on the part of 
Israel, in February of 2011, the U.S. utilized its veto power in the gathering of the UN 
Security Council to prevent the establishment of a resolution denouncing the Israeli 
settlements in Palestinian territory. Such an action was not meant to be considered 
support for the actions of Israel regarding those settlements, as Washington is said to be 
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of the opinion that “the Israeli settlements lacked legitimacy”201 but the official opinion 
is that such a resolution would only reduce the chances of re-opening negotiations for 
peace between Israel and Palestine. The usage of the veto power for supporting the 
Israeli side of the Israel-Palestine conflict is not new to the U.S., it would mark the 9
th
 
such occasion since 2000.
202
  
Table 6 U.S.-Israel Timeline of Relations 
Date Event Amount 
1990  Increase in American equipment stockpile in 
Israel
203
 
 Loan Guarantee 
 “Arrow” Missile system development 
USD 700 million 
USD 400 million 
USD 52 million 
1991  “Arrow” Missile system 
 Persian war damages costs204 
 Madrid Conference, jointly conducted by U.S. 
and the Soviet Union
205
  
USD 42 million 
USD 650 million 
1992  Loan Guarantee, over 5 years206 
 “Arrow” Missile system development  
USD 10 billion 
USD 54 million 
1993  “Arrow” Missile system development USD 57.7 million 
1994  U.S. facilitated Israeli-Jordanian treaty207 
 Reduction in previous loan guarantee 
 
 
 “Arrow” Missile system development 
 
(-USD 774 million) 
due to settlement 
activity 
USD 56.4 million 
1995  “Arrow” Missile system development USD 47.4 million 
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1996  Israeli reduction in economic support fund (ESF) 
and increase in military aid (via FMF) 
 
 
 “Arrow” Missile system development 
Reduction to zero in 
ESF but an FMF 
increase to USD 2.4 
million  
USD 59.53 million 
1997  “Arrow” Missile system development USD 35 million 
1998  “Arrow” Missile system development USD 94.9 million 
1999  Funds to facilitate the completion of the Wye 
agreement 
 “Arrow” Missile system development 
USD 1.2 billion 
 
USD 45 million 
2000  Completion of the Strategic Defence Initiative – 
First operational and tested “Arrow system”208 
 Tension over weapons sales to China 
 Migration Fund 
 “Arrow” Missile system development 
 
 
 
USD 60 million 
USD 80 million 
2001  Funds offered by President Clinton for various 
projects during an official visit to Israel 
 Initiation of joint biennial exercise, Juniper Cobra, 
to work on integrating their weapons, radars, and 
other systems
209
 
 Migration Fund 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
USD 350 Million 
 
 
 
 
USD 60 million 
USD 92 million 
2002  Tension over weapons sales to China 
 Migration Fund 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
 
USD 60 million 
USD 126.4 million 
2003  Migration Fund 
 Loan guarantee210 
 FMF 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
USD 59.6 million 
USD 9 billion 
USD 2.34billion 
USD 124.6 million 
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2004  Migration Fund 
 FMF 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
USD 49.7 million 
USD 2.38 billion 
USD 135.6 million 
2005  Reopening of the Rafah crossing between Gaza 
and Egypt 
 The United States imposed restrictions in defence 
ties to Israel, after Israeli plans to upgrade 
Chinese Harpy Killer drone aircraft. Restrictions 
were cancelled after an agreement mandating 
Israeli consultation with the U.S. government on 
sensitive arms transfers to third parties was 
signed. 
 Migration Fund 
 FMF 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USD 50 million 
USD 2.45 billion 
USD 152 million 
2006  Migration Fund 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
 President Bush states Israel will be defended by 
the U.S. despite not being part of a Mutual 
Defence Alliance 
USD 40 million 
USD 60.25 million 
2007  Loan guarantee 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
 Bush government increasing FMF for Israel by 
USD 6 billion over the next 10-years
211
 
 U.S. recognises Israel as a potential research 
partner for Department of Homeland Security  
USD 400 million 
USD 79.5 million 
2008  Loan guarantee 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
 AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar system was installed in 
Israel, improving Israel‟s capability but also 
USD 400 million 
USD 77.5 million 
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defining the nature of their alliance further.
212
    
2009  Netanyahu accepted for the first time that the 
peace process would result in the establishment of 
a Palestinian state
213
 
 10-month suspension of Israeli settlement 
construction 
 U.S. approved USD 205 million for a full 
purchase of 10 Iron Dome
214
, portable air defence 
systems, for Israel  
 Israel announced the purchase of 20 F-35 fighter 
aircrafts from U.S., completely financed by FMF. 
 Loan guarantee 
 “Arrow” Missile system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USD 400 million 
USD 77.7 million 
2010  Israel raided an aid flotilla bound for Gaza, 
attracting international criticism but found U.S. on 
its side
215 
 
 U.S. withdrew from joint military exercises with 
Turkey when it barred Israel from participating.
216
 
 The Israeli cabinet approved a bill that requires 
the consent of a supermajority (80 out of 120) in 
the Knesset (parliament) or a national referendum 
prior to any territorial withdrawal.
217
 
 Announcement of new settlements218 
 Loan guarantee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USD 400 million 
USD 79.34 million 
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 “Arrow” Missile system 
2011  Obama Administration requested USD 3 billion in 
FMF to Israel 
 Despite disapproval over Israel‟s plans for 
construction in the occupied territories, the U.S. 
vetoes a UN renouncement of Israel for its 
actions.
219
 
 
 
What are the effects of political relations on the arms trade between the U.S. and 
Israel?  
One of the core issues to be examined when discussing this alliance is the need for it. 
Although primarily outside our timeframe, it is important to highlight that apart from 
the traditional support Israel has enjoyed from the U.S. government and its population, 
Israel was needed by the U.S. to curb the influence of the USSR in the region. After the 
collapse this need would have been questionable, but the increasing threat posed by Iran 
and the Islamic movements in the region furthered the alliance.
220
 Overall, in the case of 
Israel, American arms have played an important part in maintaining Israel‟s defence in 
the face of potential threats from the Arab coalitions,
221
 making America nearly 
irreplaceable and placing them in a position of some power over Israel.  
Looking at the timeline above and studying the U.S.-Israel relationship on the basis of 
the types of grants, international commitments and arms and technology transfers, it 
would be possible to interpret the status the U.S. and Israel have allotted to each other. 
Israel has been one of the highest recipients of U.S. aid, averaging around 2.5-3 billion 
annually
222
 and accounting for approximately 20%
223
 of Israel‟s military budget. Such 
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heavy commitment by the U.S. in Israel‟s development is an indicator of America‟s 
long term goals with Israel. Apart from financial transfers, U.S. and Israel have tried to 
integrate their military systems, as well as partnered up on development projects such as 
the „Arrow‟-system. Recently in 2008, the U.S. deployed its AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar 
system in Israel. The most unique feature of this radar system is that it is connected to 
U.S.‟s global satellite system, and that it was installed in Israel, which they now have 
access to. Although this radar system is manned by American troops, integration of 
U.S.‟s network with Israel is another indicator of trust shared amongst the two 
countries, especially when U.S. is known for its hesitancy in sharing military 
technology and knowledge.
224
 Also the amount of U.S. manufactured arms in service in 
the Israeli defence sector averages about 85% from 1990 onwards
225
; this heavy 
dependency on U.S. manufactured arms also indicates Israel‟s trust and political 
allegiance to the U.S. From the above it is easy to deduce that the U.S. and Israel view 
each other as long term partners in the global arena, and this relationship has been 
reaffirmed with sensitive and massive arms and aid transfers. Thus simply through a 
realist‟s eye, Israel was an increasingly useful extension of U.S. foreign policy in the 
region and a relation it fuelled through loan guarantees, economic and military aid, 
diplomatic support and favourable arms transfers. 
As mentioned before, the need for an Israeli relationship could be credited to stemming 
of the Soviet expansion and later because of Iranian hostility towards America as well 
as Israel. But the U.S. has also had different agendas for the region; after the collapse of 
the Soviet and the common hostility shared by the Arab nations towards the Iranian 
government, the U.S. found many on its side. Thus a peaceful region would be more 
favourable for the U.S. than just an ally in the form of Israel. One of its key demands 
has been to halt Israeli territorial expansion to please the Arab nations in the region. The 
U.S. has, on several occasions, called for a peaceful coexistence of Palestine and Israel. 
It has been deeply involved in mediation between Israel, the Palestinian Liberation 
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Organization (PLO), and the members of the Arab league, and successfully saw the 
Oslo accord being signed in Washington while it mediated Egypt-Israel and Jordan-
Israel peace treaties. Thus, over time, the U.S has used arms trade to form and develop 
its relations with Israel and to extend its foreign policy in the region, throughout a 
continuously evolving scenario in the region. The U.S. has also managed to pressure 
Israel to suit its agenda, to a degree, through a form of military diplomacy, which is 
defined as “the practice of trading arms for influence over another nation‟s foreign and 
domestic politics.”226  
Brzoska and Pearson
227
 state that “the relations between suppliers only influence actors‟ 
behaviour; they do not necessarily determine it.” Considering the central role of U.S. 
weaponry in the Israeli military, one could postulate that the U.S. possesses leverage, of 
some degree, over the activities of Israel, though this is not always the case. For 
example, Israel is not allowed to use American cluster munitions in heavily populated 
areas according to U.S. export agreements, but in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, it was 
discovered that Israel did exactly that in an area full of civilians in Lebanon, so “despite 
the billions of dollars of military assistance it sends to Israel each year, the United 
States does not have enough influence to control where or how Israel uses U.S.-
provided weapons.”228  
The Israel-U.S. clash over Israel‟s sales of military technology and weaponry to China 
in 2005 is a clear cut case of where Sislin‟s concept of arms as influence is applicable in 
the relationship between America as an arms supplier, and Israel as the arms recipient.  
In accordance to the first stage of the proposed model of the occurrence of arms as 
influence, as depicted in Figure 1 earlier, Israel undertook a course of action that was 
not in accordance with the foreign policy plans of the United States, regarding the 
transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to third parties. When the U.S. is displeased with 
the actions of the Israeli government, it is well within its range to threaten to limit, or 
actually reduce, the substantial amount of aid that it provides to Israel.  
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This led to stage two, the implementation or suggestion of an instrument of influence, 
which occurred when the U.S. imposed sanctions upon Israel, withheld information, and 
prevented Israel‟s participation in several of their joint projects. This „punishment‟ led 
to an act of compliance from Israel, as, in order to not risk the further decline of their 
strong political relations, Israel was put into a position where it had to acquiesce to the 
demands imposed upon it by the U.S. regarding its arms trade. As the deals with China 
had already been made, the only way to compensate for their transgressions was to sign 
an agreement with America, giving the latter the right to oversee and authorize Israel‟s 
future arms deals to countries whose improved military or defence capabilities might 
not be in the best interests of American foreign policy. Sislin suggests that there are 
several reasons that this agreement between U.S.-Israel was likely to occur. The 
dependence of Israel on American aid and military support is a large contributing factor 
as to why the sanctions America imposed had the desired effect. The utility of 
disobedience in that case, was not enough for Israel to sacrifice the benefits it received 
from its good relationship with America. Moreover, since Israel‟s resources and 
indigenous arms production are quite tightly linked to American sources, it presented 
Israel with more incentive to succumb to the demands of the U.S. regarding its arms 
trade, or risk having its defence industry impaired. 
Another example of where Sislin‟s model is demonstrated is when the U.S. reduced its 
loan guarantee to Israel between the years of 1994 and 1997 as a direct consequence of 
the Israel‟s settlement activity beyond the 1967 border. Starting from 1994, each year‟s 
allocated amount of loan guarantees was reduced by the amount spent the previous year 
by Israel on the settlements. Though not direct arms trade as imagined by Sislin, it falls 
under our definition of arms trade as there is few barriers preventing Israel from 
utilizing it for defence purposes. The initial displeasing behaviour in this case is clearly 
the activity in the settlement area, and the ensuing form of influence was the reduction 
in loan guarantees for Israel from the U.S. As the initial reduction failed to bring a halt 
to what the U.S. considered undesirable behaviour, we can consider it a failed attempt 
according to Sislin‟s framework for use of arms as influence. The ensuing failures could 
also be attributed to the fact that the first of the loan guarantee reductions had no 
  Project Group 19 
Page | 72  
 
dissuasive effect, as one of the determinants of the success of the influence attempt is 
based on the precedents of the interaction between the two states.
229
 
Below is a graphical representation of U.S. aid transfer to Israel and Israeli procurement 
of American weapons over 20 years (Figure 4). This graph is intended to highlight 
trends in arms trade fluctuations and its correlation with U.S.-Israeli political 
relationship. Since there is a large possibility that the arms transfer from U.S. to Israel is 
politically motivated, the following graph would show any effects, negative or positive, 
of political events that either conflicted with U.S. interests or complied with them.   
The curves are formed by data relevant only to the defence sector. For aid, FMF has 
been taken into account because this aid solely deals with the defence sector. Loan 
guarantees have also been taken under the umbrella of aid. As they are issued only 
occasionally, they give additional insight into the political reality and the fact that Israel 
can use these loan guarantees on anything, even military related expenditures. Then, 
FMS and DCS values have been used to graph the arms procurement keeping with the 
SIPRI definition of Arms Trade we have adopted in this project. Then each or most of 
the years are given a normative nature, positive or negative, by us in accordance with 
U.S.-Israeli political developments.    
Figure 5 Correlation Between Arms Transfer and Political Environment Between 
U.S. and Israel 
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Table 7 Normative Assessment of U.S.-Israel Relations 
Year Nature Reason 
1992 Positive Labour party victory in Israel and sanctioning of USD 10 billion in 
Loan Guarantee for Israel 
1993/4 Positive Declaration of Principles between PLO & Israel, Israeli-Jordanian 
peace treaty 
1996 Negative Deal signed with China over arms transfer 
1997 Positive Wye Agreement 
1999 Positive Attempted implementation of the Wye Agreement by Israel 
2000 Positive Unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon 
2001 Negative Delivery of arms to China (1996-deal) 
2003 Positive Resumption of Israel-PLO talks, with U.S. involvement, Invasion of 
Iraq 
2005 Negative Suspension of Israel from the Joint Strike Fighter development 
2006 Positive Bush administration reaffirms security commitment to Israel 
2007 Positive Israel recognised as a research partner for Department of Homeland 
Security 
2008 Positive Deployment of U.S. AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar 
2009 Positive Netanyahu recognises the possibility of a 2-state-solution 
2010 Negative Announcement of new settlements 
The most striking feature of the graph above is the fluctuation seen in the aid-curve 
compared to the arms procurement-curve. This stability in the arms procurement curve 
underlines the strong relationship the U.S. and Israel have enjoyed, and also the mutual 
recognition of Israel‟s security needs. However, the aid-curve and its components could 
be dubbed as a political tool that has less effect on the Israel‟s security needs, thus it is 
effective in conveying political agendas to Israel through incentives or sanctions, while 
not compromising an ally‟s security. It is also evident that most fluctuations are caused 
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by loan guarantees, which have historically only been issued when a favoured Israeli 
government or party is in charge. 
The first jump in Curve 1 was seen in 1992-93, when a USD 10 billion loan guarantee, 
requested in 1990, was approved after the Labour Party‟s victory in 1992 and was 
distributed over the next 5 years. The Israeli Labour Party‟s agreeable agenda 
theoretically made it easier for the U.S. to agree with their actions without conflicting 
with its own foreign policy. Over the same period, Curve 2 remained constant, meaning 
this political event had no particular effect on arms procurement but a significant one on 
U.S. aid to Israel.  
As we identified years 1993 and 1994 to be positive, there was a significant positive 
change due to the event in 1992 causing the spike in 1993, but in 1994, the U.S. reduced 
its loan guarantee by USD 774 million on the basis of previous settlement on occupied 
territory. Although this action may seem contradictory to the positive status 1994 was 
given, this reduction was based on previous events and not an immediate reaction, also 
the loan guarantee was still continued. Post 1994 to 1997 also saw a slight decrease in 
arms procurement, though this decrease in Curve 2 cannot be directly linked to any 
political event identified by us, nor credited to Israel‟s arms trade with China in 1996.  
Curves 1 and 2 experience a steady increase from 1998 onwards, despite the dip in 
Curve 1 caused by the commencement of the USD 10 billion loan guarantee. 1999-2000 
saw a healthy rise in Curve 1 due to the positive initiative by Israel through the 
implementation of the Wye agreement and then unilaterally withdrawing from Lebanon, 
thereby garnering favour from the U.S. 
The year of the U.S.‟s objection to arms sales to China sees one of the most evident 
economical-political correlations in this alliance. Both Curves 1 and 2 experience a dip 
in 2001 with the negative issue as the backdrop. 
After a dull period between 2001 and 2002, 2003 shows an increase in both Curve 1 and 
2. This was the year of the resumption of talks with the PLO by Israel, with U.S. 
mediation. Additionally, the invasion of Iraq was conducted in 2003, and the U.S. had 
discussed the possibility of Israeli support in some form, thus bolstering Israel‟s 
strategic importance.       
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In the period of 2003-2005, Curve 1 experienced a subtle decrease but Curve 2 
significantly increased. 2005 marks another visible effect of politics on arms trade, 
when Israel was suspended from the JSF development programme for its weapons trade 
with objectionable countries. Finally, Israel succumbed to U.S. pressure and signed a 
binding agreement for necessary U.S. consultation before weapons trade. This unease is 
represented in the steep dip in Curve 1. Although it was also the year of the conclusion 
of the previous loan guarantee, no extensions or new grants were made. For the purpose 
of investigation, it would have been interesting to see the events of 2005 occurring 
before or during the loan guarantee agreement period, in order to be able to measure its 
effects on the loan guarantee promise. 
2006-2008 was a period of rebuilding their relationship. This time period was also 
identified as positive by us and saw a new loan guarantee of USD 2.25 billion in 2008 
spread over the next three years. This effect can be seen on the two curves, which 
increased slightly. We also identified the years 2008 and 2009 as positive and the steady 
increase in Curve 1 still continues after 2008, but Curve 2 takes a deep plunge in 2009.  
With the announcement of new settlements, we categorised 2010 as a negative year for 
U.S.-Israel relations due to the friction it caused with American goals and demands for 
the region. Still this year saw the highest arms purchase by Israel from the U.S. in the 
years of our investigation, but Curve 1 saw a slight dip, possibly indicating some 
residual effect of this position taken by Israel. 
Israel’s Economy 
Israel runs an industrial market economy where the government plays a significant 
role.
230
 Israel does not enjoy a large amount of natural resources however makes up for 
it in developed agricultural and industrial sectors.
231
 The nation, much like Pakistan, 
heavily relies on foreign aid and loans.
232
 This is apparent as Israel‟s government 
expenditures reach 55% of GDP, which make Israel‟s government the world‟s most 
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expensive.
233
 This proves that Israel is very dependent on foreign aid, especially from 
the United States. Nevertheless many factors indicate a healthy growing economy such 
as low inflation, rising employment, wages and standard of living.
234
 Israel‟s main 
trading partners besides the U.S. includes China, Belgium, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. It exports machinery and equipment, software, cut diamonds and agricultural 
products while importing raw materials, military equipment, investment goods and 
rough diamonds.
235
 Israel would be a strong developed nation if it was not in its state of 
external debt, measured at USD 89.68 billion in December 2010.
236
 This number is 
projected to increase as they continue to purchase military goods, measured at 6.3% of 
their GDP in 2009.
237
    
U.S.-Israeli economic relations 
The United States and Israel have been in a close relationship since the U.S. recognized 
them as the State of Israel in 1948. Factors of the basis of their relationship are common 
democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests.
238
 The extent of this 
relationship is carried out is through communication of understanding, economic, 
scientific, military agreements and trade. The two nations concluded an FTA in 1985, 
since this agreement, Israeli exports to the U.S. has grown 200%.
239
 Israel exports more 
than it imports to the U.S. For example, in 2010 Israel imported USD 8.2 billion from 
the U.S. while exporting USD 15.8 billion in goods to the U.S.
240
 Examples of U.S. 
investment in Israel include a USD 4.6 billion investment by Intel in its Israeli branch 
and Warren Buffet buying 80% of Iscar, an Israeli metal manufacturer, for USD 4 
billion.
241
  
Mostly all of U.S. aid to Israel comes in the appearance of military assistance. In 1998, 
the U.S. decided to reduce economic aid from USD 1.2 billion to zero over the next ten 
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years as the graph below shows, but increasing FMF.
242
  Israel also benefits from their 
relationship as their aid is delivered in the first 30 days of the fiscal year while most 
other U.S. recipients normally receive aid in installments. 
Figure 6 - U.S. Assistance to Israel (million $)
243
 
 
Structural realism and the U.S.-Israel case 
The balance of power concept within the structural realist theory is important in the 
American-Israeli case. As in the Pakistani case, where there was incentive to limit the 
power of Afghanistan, the U.S. was threatened by the rising power of Iran and wished 
to control this by providing arms to its nearby allies, including Israel
244
. Perhaps more 
importantly for the application of our theory, however, is America‟s role as a „balancer 
state‟ in the Middle East. In recent years, the growth of the anti-American feeling has 
been significant in many Arab countries. This is, in large part, due to anti-Muslim 
sentiments as a link in their war on terror. But with a growing threat from some of these 
countries, including potential discoveries of weapons of mass destruction in countries 
such as Iraq and Iran, America has been interested in giving Israel power to restore 
balance in the Middle East. 
A crucial aspect of structural realism is the idea that no alliances are permanent. This 
can be seen quite clearly in the previous case, with the changing relationship between 
the U.S. and Pakistan. In this case, however, the U.S. and Israel seem to have had a 
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constant alliance within the framework of this project. Although they have had falling 
outs and relations between them have been tense, America has still supported Israel 
during these periods, such as the Iraqi missile threats in 1989-90. However, in recent 
years we can see a change in their relationship, as America‟s wish to pursue a 
relationship with the Arab nations grows, and the need for Israel as an ally therefore is 
declining. This is merely a trend that we can discuss and attempt to predict, as we 
cannot possibly foresee their future relationship. Presently, Israel remains an important 
ally to the United States for a number of reasons. These include the Jewish influence in 
American politics, and in particular the American stock exchange
245
 due to the large 
Jewish population in America; the American exploitation of natural gas reserves in 
Israel
246
; and lastly, and most recently, the Egyptian revolution threatens the peace 
treaty between Israel and Egypt, as the creation of a new Egyptian government brings 
doubts about their future relationship. These reasons for an ongoing alliance of course 
also represent the American national interests in Israel and the surrounding region, and 
the fact that these interests are the main reasons for maintaining a close relationship 
with Israel, is a perfect example of the structural realist theory put into practice. The 
Israeli national interests are of course also important in this relationship, and these are 
the economic benefits that come from such an alliance, and the security that comes with 
the weapons against their neighbouring enemies.  
Concluding the U.S.-Israel case 
In summation, referring back to our first working question, 'what are the effects of 
political relations on arms trade?, we can see that; as the overall relationship between 
the nations is high, there is a correspondingly large amount of arms, according to our 
definition, that is traded between them. As America is the supplier state, using Sislin‟s 
terminology, we have established that the arms trade is dependent on America‟s 
perception of their relationship, as Israel cannot purchase what America is unwilling to 
sell. On occasion, as relations between the two countries have experienced difficulties, 
America has initiated some moves to limit the arms and various forms of aid that they 
provide to Israel, and though this has not always resulted in the appropriate changes in 
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behaviour as desired by the U.S., it exemplifies the link between the political relations 
and the subsequent arms trade between the two nations, though the long term and 
extensive nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship also means that there has not been as big 
as effect on the arms trade as can be seen in the U.S.-Pakistan case.   
  Project Group 19 
Page | 80  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Looking at the way in which political relations affect arms trade, the cases of U.S.-
Israel and U.S.-Pakistan have shown trends unique to each country. Based on our 
research, we can see clear indications that the arms trade between states is dependent on 
a good relationship between them, but it is also clear that this correlation is more 
evident in the U.S.-Pakistan case than that of U.S.-Israel. Even the treatment of Israel 
and Pakistan on the same issues have been different, Pakistan was heavily sanctioned 
for the presence of nuclear weapons but there was no official action by the U.S. on 
Israel‟s suspected nuclear programme.247 The type of arms traded between the said 
parties also varies. While Israel has received steady arms to secure its full national 
security from hostile groups in the Palestinian and occupied territories, Pakistan was 
pressed with sanctions and previous deals cancelled from the beginning of 1990, and 
the arms received post-2001 was of a nature to mostly supplement the war in 
Afghanistan.  
The military aid received by the two countries is skewed as well, as Israel historically 
has almost received double the amount as Pakistan. Even during the current years of the 
GWOT, Pakistan has received an average of USD 785.5 million
248
 annually between 
FY2007 and FY2012, whilst Israel received an average of USD 2.5 billion.
249
 The 
graphs (Figure 2 and Figure 4) show that Israel and the U.S. have enjoyed a steady 
alliance with no major severing in their relationship, and this is also translated in their 
arms transfer where there were no steep fluctuations. Pakistan, on the other hand, had a 
rocky start from the beginning of the 1990‟s, with significant changes in the political 
mood between them and the Americans, and again their relationship is aptly depicted in 
the negative values seen through the beginning of the graph and even in a slow positive 
progression upwards. 
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These differences show the relationship between the U.S. and Israel, which is a long-
term alliance, and despite periods of tension in this relationship, the U.S. has provided 
Israel with continuous aid, support and military assistance. Pakistan, which is a new ally 
primarily needed for its proximity to Afghanistan, however, has received periodical 
support based on the strength of their relationship, although this alliance has shown 
some growth in strength in the latter years of GWOT. 
The different nature of the two alliances has affected the way Sislin‟s concept has 
played out in the two scenarios. In respect to Israel, the U.S. has managed to impose 
influence in Israel with their arms, as an extension of foreign policy. If one glances at 
the timeline, there has been a proportionate effect on political effect on each other. U.S. 
has either rewarded or punished Israel according to their behaviour with an increase or 
decrease in loan guarantees, FMF, ESF and arms transfer. This has mainly been due to 
the long term-nature of their relationship as Israel is heavily dependent on America, 
increasing the success rate of the concept. This success is not seen in Pakistan‟s case 
because of its unstable alliance. Pakistan and the U.S. did not share an indispensible 
relation during the 1990‟s, thus additional sanctions on this relationship was less 
effective, rather Pakistan was of more importance to the U.S. than vice-versa due to it 
being the third largest wheat importer of the U.S.. It also should be taken into account 
that India‟s growing nuclear capabilities were a larger worry to Pakistan‟s national 
security than sanctions from the U.S., contributing to the failure of U.S. pressure.  
The overall most striking similarity between the two cases is that we have proven the 
correlation between arms and political relationships to be of great importance. It is 
clear, from the empirical data gathered, that arms trade agreements only take place 
when the supplier and the recipient are on good political terms. In the American-
Pakistani case, deals were made when there was a mutual need for each other, and in 
particular, a need for Pakistani cooperation as seen from an American perspective. In 
the American-Israeli case, Israel received constant support from the U.S., but its 
policies‟ were tightened when Israel did not comply with American policies. 
The most fundamental contrast between the cases, however, is the difference in the 
types of relationships between the countries. Israel, we have concluded, shows 
tendencies towards a long-term alliance with United States, whereas Pakistan is more 
temporary. This difference is significant to this investigation, because it shows the 
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importance of political bonds. Pakistan has received aid and arms as a „reward‟ for 
positive political actions, whereas Israel has received constant support from America, 
and this shows us that arms trade between „friends‟ is more likely to occur than between 
temporary allies. One of the main reasons for the difference between their types of 
relationships is that Israel is dependent on American aid and military support, whereas 
Pakistan traditionally has had other allies and is less reliant on American backing and 
defence supplies. This means that Pakistan has been able to concentrate more on 
national interests without being influenced by American threats about sanctions to a 
great degree. Israel, who is economically and militarily dependent on the U.S, has to 
keep American demands in consideration as well as its own national interests.   
Sislin‟s concept of „arms as influence‟ can be applied to both cases, as we have shown 
that the U.S. has attempted to use arms as a form of influence in both Pakistan and 
Israel. These attempts are not always successful however, but the conclusion to the 
application of this concept is that it does comply with the reality of arms trade, at least 
in these two cases. 
In relation to structural realism, the Pakistan case is a perfect example of how this 
theory applies to the arms trade. The U.S.-Pakistani relationship is based purely on the 
national interests of both states, as shown by the existence of good relations only when 
there was a mutual need for each other. The Israel case, however, shows that there are 
limitations to the applicability of our theory, as structural realism does not believe in the 
existence of long-term alliances. But in general for both cases, we have shown that arms 
can be used as a form of power, and that the United States has used this tool in an 
attempt to restore power in both regions. 
 
As viewed in the section of „military globalization‟ interdependence exists between the 
trading nations. The term military globalization means the process of increasing extent 
and scope of the security relations and the tighter integration of military forces around 
the world into a unified system. This osccurrence impacts the economy of all the 
nations involved. The current war on terrorism drains resources from the involved 
countries‟ other priorities, especially the U.S. and even others despite them receiving 
additional assistance from the U.S. This can also be seen in Israel and US‟s 
interdependence that involves the US in issues such as Palestine and the middle-eastern 
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conflict even though it is not a direct partner in the conflict. This military association of 
U.S. with Israel also affects its diplomatic goals with the other Arab nations.  
As mentioned in the section „economics behind arms trade‟, we have conveyed that in 
an oligopoly market structure, a firm will have influence over their costumers and have 
the ability to use this influence to benefit itself. So do the arms producing nations who 
enjoy the same benefits in this oligopolistic world market. This market system has made 
security choices more rigid and inflexible, but at the same time accelerated the 
formations of alliances, because most nations would want the best supplies and the most 
attractive political ties, rather than only the lowest possible price. For example, Israel 
procures defence supplies from the U.S. because they aim to maintain their status of a 
powerful high tech military and enjoy the American support in regional and global 
issues, therefore making this trade a much smarter choice than the cheapest available 
arms supplies. But this choice also comes with the compromise of greater American 
influence such as the case of American consultation prior to Israeli defence deals to 
other nations. Thus the simple notion of trade is transformed into a diplomatic power 
equation, and all due to the imperfect nature of arms trade.   
Arms trade, like most other large scale universal trades, attracts a significant amount of 
employment. Despite the nature of this industry, it still involves and creates 
employment in civilian markets.  This market of arms production and trade employs a 
large field consisting of producers, sellers, buyers, traders and users (military). Not only 
the main actors are employed by the arms industry, there are also indirect actors such as 
the steel workers who manufacture the parts that defence manufactures will use to 
assemble a JSF aircraft for instance and the technicians who produce the software and 
navigation that affects aircrafts and missiles. An almost perfect example of employment 
was during the Second World War, in the era of total war, American unemployment 
was at a low of 1.2% and that included persons of 14 years and older. (The current 
American unemployment stands at 9.6%).
250
  According to American government 
estimates the arms industry employed 5 million
251
 people including the military, 
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defence and civilian sectors in 2007. Although this must be a generous estimate, it gives 
us insight to possible incentives of employment in the trading of arms with political 
partners. However, it is rather impossible to measure the importance of this factor as 
figures are often hard to find and process and government bias would always be 
attached in the form of exaggeration.  
The arms industry is not mainly an industry for economic purposes. As this project has 
stated there are further diplomatic decisions behind each arms deal than only economic 
ones. Arms trade is a relatively small amount of exports compared to the total amount. 
Therefore there are small economic advantages in arms trade as a whole and it can be 
argued that a nation can use its factors of production elsewhere. But one of the major 
relevance of this industry is its sensitive nature. We can see comparative advantage, 
oligopoly and military globalisation all have an effect of making one nations security 
needs into a matter of larger diplomatic concern than only a matter of simple trading of 
goods. 
To answer our first working question, „what are the effects of political relations on 
arms trade?‟ We can conclude that a positive political relationship leads to an increase 
in arms trade between countries. Although this trend is not quite as evident in the U.S.-
Israel case, as represented by our graphs (Figure 4), tension between these two states 
did see a fall in their arms transfer. 
To conclude our second working question, „what are the effects of economic systems on 
political behaviour?‟; as we have stated and proven many times before, the U.S. is the 
world‟s leading exporter of arms. They are responsible for this position, due to their 
intensive Research and Development, as their technology is far more advanced than any 
other nation in the world. It is due to the U.S. high tech advantage that, through 
comparative advantage theory, they have specialized in what can be manufactured 
relatively cheaper and efficiently on American soil compared to any other nation. The 
U.S. and arms trade both affect each other as the U.S. is the leading supplier but as the 
world continues to unify each nation through globalization, arms trade affects the U.S. 
by drawing them into this cycle.  
 
In conclusion of our third, and last, working question, „how do the relations in regards 
to arms trade compare/contrast between U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Israel?‟, we found one 
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main difference; the type of relationship between the countries, and one main similarity, 
which is also the answer to the first working question; that arms trade between the states 
is directly linked to a positive political relationship between them. Furthermore, both 
the concept of „arms as influence‟ and the theory of structural realism have been proved 
to be compliant with our case studies.  
To answer our problem formulation we must first see if the hypothesis has been rejected 
or not. Our hypothesis states that „arms trade can be used as an indicator of the United 
States relationship with Pakistan and Israel,’ and by answering the working questions, 
we can conclude that this, in fact, is correct in relation to our two case studies. As 
mentioned above, the arms trade between countries is dependent on a positive 
relationship, and therefore, we can use this trade to detect whether or not a relationship 
exists. We can see that the U.S. relationship to Pakistan and Israel affects the arms trade 
between these nations, therefore, arms trade can be used as an indicator of such 
relations, and our hypothesis has thus been proven.  
Our problem formulation, „using the case studies of U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Israel, how 
and to what extent can arms trade be used to indicate a relationship between the U.S. 
and its allies?‟ aimed to create an observation of American relations, in regards to arms 
trade, towards its allies in general. As the two cases in use are innately diverse, we 
cannot generalize the type of relationship between the U.S. and all its allies based on the 
comparison of the U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Israel case studies. However, we have proven 
with the help of our concept and theory of choice that the general trend is that a positive 
political relationship is needed for arms trade to occur. As our case studies depict such 
extreme types of relationship, we can draw the conclusion that other relations to the 
U.S. that fall between this range would also show a similar trend, and we can therefore 
apply this to the U.S. and its other allies. As a result, in answer to our problem 
formulation, we conclude that arms trade is a strong indicator of a relationship between 
the U.S. and its allies. 
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Afterthoughts 
The aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death 
On Sunday 1
st
 of May 2011, President Barack Obama announced to the world that 
Osama bin Laden had been killed by U.S. forces. Bin Laden was hiding in a compound 
in Abbatobad, which located 35 miles north of Pakistan‟s capital, Islamabad.252 The 
United States started questioning the Pakistani military forces and government, and they 
urged them to prove that they were not aware of bin Laden‟s whereabouts.253 Pakistan 
publicly denied knowing the location of bin Laden, and was mostly upset by the fact 
that the United States had launched the attack without notifying them, hence violating 
their sovereignty. However, there has been recent evidence showing that the Pakistani 
government and military was aware and assisted America‟s launched attack on Osama 
bin Laden.
254
 
The reason for Pakistan to deny being part of the operation can be concluded by 
different factors. There is a growing displeasure in Pakistan towards the United States, 
since they perceive that America is overwhelmingly involved in Pakistani affairs. The 
Pakistani population is also unhappy about the constant drone attacks conducted by 
America within their territory. Therefore, if Pakistan was to publicly state that they 
were deeply involved in the launched attack towards bin Laden, they would have to face 
popular uprising. Furthermore this would not be pleasing to their Arab state allies.
255
 
This event might cause another fall out between the United States and Pakistan. Even 
though Pakistan assisted in the operation, they did not know the whereabouts of Osama 
bin Laden; therefore their capabilities could be questioned by America. The reason for 
the great amount of U.S. aid and arms transfers to Pakistan is so they can be equipped 
and fight the war on terror. If America does not see them as a capable government to 
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perform that task, they might question their allegiance. If this was the case then U.S. aid 
and arms transfer to Pakistan could decrease significantly and America might find a 
stronger and more convenient allegiance. 
The future of the U.S.-Israeli alliance 
Throughout the project, and in the conclusion, we have concluded that Israel and the 
United States share a long-term alliance. However, we believe that the relationship 
between them might be changing. In the past couple of years, the U.S. has been wishing 
to improve relations with the Arab world, and by doing this the alliance with Israel is 
automatically undermined. This phenomenon would have been interesting to 
investigate, as it could prove that, as structural realism states, their relationship is not 
permanent, but merely a very long short-term alliance. From a realist viewpoint, this 
means that Israel has been an important ally to the United States for all these years due 
to their role in maintaining American national interests, e.g. by balancing power in the 
Middle East. 
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